Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
Top Secret Figure 6 Changed Soviet Perceptions of the Effort Required To Accomplish the Objectives of the Initial Air Operation, 1969-83 Number of Sorties by Ground -Combat -l--n-ialof rround Attack Aircraft- h Attack Aircraft C . ahximum 1983 Maxium 93 Minimum 1983 Minimum 1983 1975 1975 1969 1969 1Hundreds 969.100 14 - ~- 350 - --- - 12 --- -3 0- - - _ ._ ._ . - 0 250 - --- -- - - - 200 - - 50 2- -t.. 250- 1 2 3 4 S 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8Massed air raid Massed air raid 'Military writings indicate the Sovicts believed in 1969 and 1975that the Esti ed operational readiness races and aircraft atrition are based on anobjeclives of the air operation could he achieved with three massed ima ald per aton rsedins athes andie icaa Triinhe banedvonraids.Iy the early 1980s,.however,they expected that six-la-eight raids appearn e of thetrce redutions due Thaenti-rtacBvariationin hewould he required. magnitde of uhrelate air activity contrcted betweenthevassed air raits. o Weassume hatalt mased air raidsareconducted acrosshefull width c The Soviets'method of estimatingthe relativecombatpotential of aircraft figher-h mb ers tinga fth (seoro ner cht i rr n he and 1seeappendix C ) hasbeen applied to the duat from th e so rtieg raph to fcgher~oncterInhprtricipat ing formationsoneach air raid. The 1969 depicttheir perceptions ocfthe impactof theirforcenrodariatiao prrrgrrnmforce uses the aircrafto. the two western LongRangeAviation bomber on theamountof firepoweraa ilablefor he operation. corps, GSFG. NGiF. the light-hormer division fromthe BalticMD.and the Italtic FlectAir Forces.Nuclear reserveis 33 percentformediumbombersand 25 percentfor all others. The 1975forceadds the non-Soviet WarsawPact lacticnl air forcesand reducesthe front aviation nuclearreserveto 10percent. The 1983force is takenfrom the moderateestimate in tahle3,except that the heavy hombers arc excfuded. The Vinnitsa air army participatesonly for the ist four daysof theoperationtsix air raids). 30a3a 1244 15 To S3ecret II
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.