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This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
Top Secret designating the Pact's newly authorized wartime According to Soviet military writings, by 1981 theWestern high command to be the previously lacking General Staff had devised a new mployment concptfocal point for integrating the planning and direction that, by emphasizing the principle of concentration ofof the highly complex air defcnse operation-a func- force, would allow the initial air operation to betion formrly left to the Soviet Air Forces Main Staff conducted with near parity in the theaterwide airand the multitude of regional air defense commands. balance. According to the new concept, the initial airAs part of the reorganization of Soviet air forces and operation could be conducted either following thetticair def forces in 1980 and 1981. the national and initial air defense operation or as a first attack at thetactical air defense forces around the Soviet periphery outset of war, by concentrating the massed airraids in wrcom bundee r unified ssytem of control at all specific sectors of the TMO, rather than across its fullcomtand c elons. Perhaps mt ihmportant, the Sovi- width. This concept is intended to allow the Pact toets recognized that the air forces and the air defense temporarily achieve highly favorable force ratios inforces must function as what they call an 'operational each sector and to minimize its aircraft losses bytean," Toward this end, they began to establish joint saturating NATO's air defenses.command posts for the battle staffs of the air forces and the newly unified air defense forces for the high The Soviets' revised perception of the initial aircommand, front, and army headquarters, to allow operation also emphasizes the need to increase thethem to more effectively coordinate and control simul- duration of the operation and the striking power thattaneotis air dfneand offensive air activity, could be brought to bear in each massed air raid. Soviet military writings indicate that the reassessment Recet Cangeinthe nital Ar Oof force requirements dictates six to eight massed airterRecent Chanto~es in the Initial Air Operation. Despite raids over a period of three to five days, as opposed totheir efforts tdevielop the sn-called air defense the earlier formulation of three massed air raids in aoperation, the Soviets continued to believe that the day and a half. This change may indicate the Sovietsfinal attainment of strategic air supremacy could have concluded that, by accepting the higher overallcome only through a successful initial air operation- Pact attrition implicit in a prolonged operation, theya belief consistent with their doctrine that only the could achieve air supremacy with a much lower-andoffensive can produce a victoryh By 1979, however, the hence more achievable-kill ratio.' We estimate theGeneral Staff had concluded that the initial air Soviets' air operation plans now include at least fouroperation was a weak link in the Warsaw Pact's or five times the air forces ground attack firepowerability to establish mastery over the Western TMO. called for in their plans from the mid-I97Os (figure 6 .Because of their appa.rent perception that the Central European air balance had been altered, the General Staff probably calculated that Pact air forces were These changes in the concept of the inital air opera-unlikely aatage than about a 1.2-to.-I combat lion were complemented by changes in the forcespotential advantage in the air balance at the start of a expected to execute it. The 1980-81 reorganization ofwar (see appendix C. Near parity in the air balance the Soviet Air Forces improved their ability to quicklymeant substantially greater risk of failure with the concentrate airpower against deep targets in variousinitial air operation-a higher percentage of NATO's sectors of the TMO by doubling the total number ofcombat aircraft would have to be destroyed to attain medium and light bomber strike regiments assigned toair supremacy and this would require a more lopsided strategic aviation opposite NATO. Strategic aviationPact aircraft kill-ratio advantage, forces in the west subsequently have been given top * If-as their military writings and our analysis suggest-the ' If the Soviets plan to conduct eight massedair raids ver five daysSoviets now calculate that there would most likely be parity in the and if thoy continue to project the ow umuative attrition rate ofstarting qualitative air balance in the Western TMO, they would only abou 5 tcrccn prje the w aruatv e a parn t yhave to destroy about two-thirds of NATO's combat aircraft to y 2 e in in the war (a value apparentlyachieve the 2.55-to- ratio representing air supremacy (assuming prob ot in the middle and 0l tey wuladthe Pact suffered overall attrition or onty S5percentl. This tevet of have. torhedAarfocsb at 70s) ntheyt t ordestruction would require a Pact aircraft kill-ratio advantage of approachable aircraft kill-ratio advantage of about 1.9:1.about 3:1 in the operation. p c an TU i ' ,reg 14
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.