Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
Top Secret priority for modernization with the longer range theater high command, Soviet military writings stateBackfire and Fencer bombers, Increased firepower for that the primary objectives of the so-called initial aircach massed air raid was also obtained by expanding defense operation would be to:the role of the ground forces artillery and missile * Break up NATO's offensive counterair campaign.forces in thc su pression o -NATO's forward air - Weaken the main body of NATO's air forces.dc fenses . Provide air defense against the NATO air raids for Warsaw Pact forces and important rear area installations. - Create favorable conditions for winning air suprem- acy with the initial air operation in the earl sta 'es of a decisive strategic offensive operation Planning. Military writings and exercises indicate that the plans for the first phase of the initial air defense operation are drafted in peacetime by the Soviet General Staff, but the air and air defense staffs of the Western high command would be responsible for updating them before their execution and for drafting plans for subsequent phases of the operation.We believe the Soviet military leadership-apparent- Each phase typically would contain two or threely expecting that NATO probably would attempt to massed sorties,'0 presumably allowing planners toseize the intitive in the air war-probably views a compensate for lessons learned from previous phases.so-called air defense operation as the most likely form The Western high command would determine theof Warsaw Pact air co bat at the start of war in the specific objectives of the operation, the distribution ofWestern TMO. The sector attack concept, however, forces and assignment of blocks of targets amonggives the Soviets the option of launching an offensive subordinate operational-level formations, and the se-air operation as part of a synchronized air and ground lection of employment conceptsoffensive at the outset of war without first substantial- ly altering the air balance. The Soviets may thus view Detailed planning, such as assigning specific targetsit as a more attractive alternative to the so-called air to individual combat units and selecting flight routesdefense operation either at the outset of war or with the aid of computers would be performed for onefollowing a brief and inconclusive period of defensive massed sortie at a time by the operations staffs of theoperations, 0 various front air defense forces, second-echelon na- tional air defense formations, strategic air armies,The next two sections of this paper contain more front and fleet air forces, and the ground forcesdetailed discussions of Soviet force employment con- artillery and missile forces staffs tasked to execute thecepts for executing the initial air defense operation operation. and the initial air operation for theater air supremacy. Subsequent sections cover what the Soviets consider to be the other theater-level air forces' roles-partici- oordition etween pation in the first major nuclear strike, bomber air and air defense planners and control of the offensives, airborne and amphibious landing opera- operation would be accomplished at the joint air andtions, and strategic reconnaissance air defense command posts at the high command, Ll front, and ground army headquarterThe Initial Air Defense Operation f The Soviets believe that a successful air defense operation would be critical to their prospects for '* The Soviets usethe term "massedstrikes" to describe both whatseizing the strategic initiative in the TMO if NATO we call the "massedsorties" in air defense operations and what we attacked first and that it would require a massive joint refer to asthe "massedair raids" inair operations forces effort under the centralized direction of the TopSecret 16
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.