Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
TOrsEiRET IV. Capabilities A. Ground Forces 1. General The doctrine which emerged from a debate published in the classified journal Military Thought in the early 1960's had as its central theme the con- viction that a war with NATO in Europe would either begin with, or quickly escalate to, the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear warfare would not, however, avert the need for large ground forces. These would be required not only to sustain the expected high casualty rates but also to exploit the nuclear strikes by eliminating substantial surviving NATO forces and consolidating the conquest of Europe. The forces requirement was complicated by the great distance between the probable area of initial conflict, i.e., Germany, and the western USSR where the bulk of the units intended for the European theater of operations were located. This complication, and the doubts that these reinforce- ments could ever reach the conflict area after hostilities had begun, helped incline Soviet military thought toward the idea that at least a "short period of tension" would precede the outbreak of hostilities. Soviet writings expressed a hope that this period of tension (which even achieved a certain dogmatic aura by being officially designated as the "special period") would allow time for covert mobilization and the move- ment westward of some reinforcements. The current Warsaw Pact ground forces represent a compromise between the Soviet military planners' concepts of requirements for very large combat-ready forces, and economic and political con- straints which made such large forces unacceptable. Faced-with this situation the Soviets have sought a solution through the development of a capability- for rapid mobilization and reinforcement. The concept is to maintain a large enough ready force in the forward area--East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia -- to defend against an unexpected attack and provide delay time while keeping a skeleton force which can be mobilized quickly in the western USSR. - 16. - T() SEGRET
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.