Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
The "short period of tension" is still, however, a vital ingredient in Soviet thinking. By implication, the Soviets--and their allies--have serious doubts as to whether they could successfully complete mobilization and-deployment if hostilities should begin without warning. 2. Organization a. Divisions Soviet line divisions are small by US standards, but have about the same numbers of tanks as similar US divisions. The Soviet tank division, at about 8,000 men, has only half as many personnel as the US armored division. The Soviet motorized rifle division, at about 10,000, is only slightly more than half as large as the US mechanized division--its nearest counterpart. Both Soviet divisions have considerably less infantry and a much lower proportion of combat and service support and, although fully mobile, have only about half as many motor vehicles as do US divisions. According to Soviet statements, in both classified and unclassified sources, these divisions have been designed for speed, firepower, and shock action in short-duration combat, with minimum organic service and. support. These same statements indicate that the Soviets have attempted to optimize their divisions' organization for nuclear warfare. We believe. that the tank units of these divisions would have the capability to launch a powerful initial assault. Their capability to sus- tain an offensive, however, would depend, in large part, on their ability to maintain their maneuver units at combat-effective strength, and on the pro- vision of adequate combat and service support.. Current analysis indicates that the divisions' mobile stocks of POL and ammunition are sufficient for only about three days of intensive combat. After this period they would lose their combat effectiveness unless full-scale logistic support was initiated. Also the. relatively small -17 - C'.IT
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.