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OSR Contribution to NIE 11-14-68, Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces, CIA/DI/OSR, October 1968.

Central Intelligence Agency · 115 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.

About six divisions on the Chinese border--all
of them in the Far East MD--have probably achieved
combat readiness so far. If the present rate of
increase in equipment and personnel continues, all
of the 24 divisions now in the border area could be
combat ready by late 1969. The Soviet plan for
forces along the border probably encompasses more
than 24 divisions. A buildup of at least four ad-
ditional new divisions appears to be taking place
in the border region.
Although part of the increase is probably aimed
at strengthening Soviet border security along the
vulnerable Trans-Siberian Railway, the Soviets are
also creating two groupings of forces with signifi-
cant offensive operational capabilities: one in the
5th Army area in the southern Maritime Territory and
the other in the region east of Lake Baikal. It was
from these areas that the Soviets made their most
successful advances against the Japanese Army in
1945 (see foldout map, Figure 3). They are the most
suitable regions for launching military operations
into northeast China.
It is unlikely that the Soviets are preparing
for any large-scale invasion of China, but the
development of these two groupings may signal an
intention to be prepared to act decisively to
influence events in Asiatic regions contiguous to
the USSR. In the event of a complete breakdown of
central control in China, for example, the Soviets
would have forces readily available which could
intervene in support of any pro-Soviet political
elements that might exist in border regions. These
forces also provide insurance against future acts
by China which the Soviets might view as threatening.
Thus far the buildup has been achieved without
any apparent reduction of the Soviet forces facing
NATO, although it has probably caused some slowdown
in the program to supply those forces with more
modern equipment. It probably has caused an increase
in the personnel strength of the general purpose
forces of the Soviet Union. By late 1969, if no
offsetting reductions are made in other areas, the
buildup will probably have increased personnel
strength along the border to a total of about 300,000.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.