Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
About six divisions on the Chinese border--all of them in the Far East MD--have probably achieved combat readiness so far. If the present rate of increase in equipment and personnel continues, all of the 24 divisions now in the border area could be combat ready by late 1969. The Soviet plan for forces along the border probably encompasses more than 24 divisions. A buildup of at least four ad- ditional new divisions appears to be taking place in the border region. Although part of the increase is probably aimed at strengthening Soviet border security along the vulnerable Trans-Siberian Railway, the Soviets are also creating two groupings of forces with signifi- cant offensive operational capabilities: one in the 5th Army area in the southern Maritime Territory and the other in the region east of Lake Baikal. It was from these areas that the Soviets made their most successful advances against the Japanese Army in 1945 (see foldout map, Figure 3). They are the most suitable regions for launching military operations into northeast China. It is unlikely that the Soviets are preparing for any large-scale invasion of China, but the development of these two groupings may signal an intention to be prepared to act decisively to influence events in Asiatic regions contiguous to the USSR. In the event of a complete breakdown of central control in China, for example, the Soviets would have forces readily available which could intervene in support of any pro-Soviet political elements that might exist in border regions. These forces also provide insurance against future acts by China which the Soviets might view as threatening. Thus far the buildup has been achieved without any apparent reduction of the Soviet forces facing NATO, although it has probably caused some slowdown in the program to supply those forces with more modern equipment. It probably has caused an increase in the personnel strength of the general purpose forces of the Soviet Union. By late 1969, if no offsetting reductions are made in other areas, the buildup will probably have increased personnel strength along the border to a total of about 300,000. - 15 - TOP_2SE:,ET
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.