Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
TOPE ET Under the present plan, a Polish Front is to make a thrust along the seaward flank, a force composed of both Soviet (GSFG) and East German forces in East Germany is assigned the Front role in the central sector, and forces from Czechoslovakia would c-on stitut_e a Front on the southern flank. the seconaz ech-- intne Czech sector is a Soviet ront from the Carpathian region of the Ukraine. The Soviet forces in Belo- russia and perhaps the 11th Guards Army in the Baltic Military District appear to be designed to perform as a second-echelon Front behind the GSFG or Polish Fronts. The Front from Czechoslovakia has the mission of advancing as far as the west bank of the Rhine in the area roughly between Mannheim and the Swiss border. this Front, as designed for the mission, is composed of three combined-arms armies, one tactical air army, and assorted Front combat and service support units. The Polish Front, of the same general com- position but larger in size, probably has an offen- sive zone of responsibility about one hundred miles wide extending as far west as the English Channel at Ostende. The Soviet and East German Front--comprising as many as four combined arms and two tank armies, a massive air army, and other combat and service support units--has the responsibility of destroying the main body of NATO forces in the center. The two Fronts from the western USSR are apparently intended for commitment after the NATO forces have been significantly weakened by the attacks of the- first-echelon Fronts. Evidence, suggests that with these fresh torces restne responsibility for the final offensive to the channel coast. The most critical aspect of this plan to the Soviets is the need to isolate the European theater in an extremely short period of time--perhaps less than three weeks. -6 - TO 3SECRET
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.