Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
The Warsaw Pact contingency plan for the central region of Europe clearly posits a rapid achievement of numerical superiority in maneuver units, tanks, and artillery. However, with the exception of tanks, such-superiority is not main- tained in peacetime. The success of the plan would depend in large part on the rapid mobilization for most of the rear services support force and even for some of the combat force. Highly reliable evidence outlines the major teatures ot the plan for mobilizing Warsaw Pact forces against NATO in the central region. The extent of mobili- zation of a Front apparently is related to.the ex- pected timetable for its commitment to battle. As much as one-third of the Czech and Polish Fronts is to be mobilized within three days. One-half to two-thirds of the Carpathian and Belorussian Fronts are apparently expected to be mobilizing at about the same time. Prior to the Czechoslovak invasion, only the Soviet forces in Germany were near full strength. Evidently the Warsaw Pact countries, including the USSR, intend to begin deploying the ready portions of their Fronts from the interiors of their countries before the whole force is completely mobilized. The leading elements of the two Soviet Fronts from the western USSR, for example, are expected to arrive in central Poland and Czechoslovakia within three to six days. The Soviets anticipate that the main elements of these two Fronts would participate in combat oper- ations within two weeks after mobilization.is ordered. B. Extension of Soviet Power The Soviets have evidently concluded that the achievement of many of their foreign policy ob- jectives in the "uncommitted world" will require a strong Soviet military presence. In the last few years, they have begun to move away from their pre- vious tendency of avoiding potential military con- frontations in areas not contiguous to the USSR or its neighboring allies. The year-round operation of naval squadrons in areas long the domain of the ______ - US and British navies is one example of this evolution in the Soviets' thinking on how to use their forces. -9 - TOP RRET
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.