Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
TOP SER-2 II. Policy and Plans A. The Warsaw Pact Mission In the eyes of the Soviets, the overriding mission of the general purpose forces is security in. Central Europe. Significant new bodies of evi- dence are now available which give a clear image of the main features of their plan for the contingency of a war in this region, and the manner in whidh they intend to employ the main Warsaw Pact forces. In general terms, the plan (see Figure 1, foldout map following this page) envisions a broad rapid advance through West Germany and on to the English Channel by a force of five Fronts in two echelons.* The primary offensive missions are evi- dently the responsibility of the Warsaw Pact forces (the first echelon) presently deployed in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Two Fronts (the second echelon) from the western USSR are apparently in- tended mainly for the final isolation of Western Europe from reinforcement. The recent crisis with Czechoslovakia will probably have no appreciable effect on the essential aspects of the main Warsaw Pact plan. Nonetheless, significant shifts in force composition may occur in order to make Soviet troops responsible for ful- filling missions.formerly entrusted to Polish and Czechoslovakian forces. The term "echelon" has special meaning in the Soviet view of military operations. Soviet doctrine envisages large groupings of troops deployed behind the front-line or first-echelon.units and not engaged in combat with the enemy. This second echelon would be committed only after the first-echelon forces have been substantially engaged by the enemy. In some sense the second echelon is a reserve, but it is a maneuvering force, often with predetermined objec- tives. The Soviet concept of echelons is applicable at all levels, including army, Front, and even the theater eevet. -5 - TO SECRETQ
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.