III-018 “The Theory of Military Art Needs Review,” by Col. Gen. A.I. Gastilovich and Lt. Gen. I.A. Tolkonyuk, special collection of Military Thought, top secret issue No. 1, 1960, CIA/DP Clandestine Report Special Collection, 18 December 1961,

mited, i.e., an average of 11 million persons per year. The losses
of 72 inrring countries during the six ycars of World WDr II totaled
about 34 million persons killed and 28 million persons unimed, or
an average also of about 11 million persons per year. According to
tho data of a special study by the Office of Civil Defense of the
USA conducted in 1955, the losses in the course of several hours
froy the first aerial attack carried out chiefly by atomic and thermo-
nuclear weapons totaled 15 million persons dead and about 24 million
persons sick and wounded, altosether up to 40 etillion in the USA
- alone. In addition, about 50 to 60 percent of the country's industry
was destroyed. It is well to note. that in the above-mentioned study-
only 53 cities were subjected to the pre-arranged attack and that
thermonuclear bombs were dropped on only 11 of these cities. The
- moral fatigue of peoples, which became evident toward the end of
World L'ar I as well as of World ar II, is well known. It is easy .
to iragine how great this fatigue and depression trill be after the
first nuclear strikes in a future war.
It appears to us that after the first nuclear/missile strikes, -
- the basis for all operations on a strategic scale must be a decisive -
offensive against the as yet unrecovered enemy; the more quickly
and energetically that this is accomplished, the more probable that
the enemy will be unable to cope with the disruption brought about -
by the first attack, and to organize stubborn resistance.
Wihoever withstands the first enemy attack must conclude the var -
rapidly. - - "
At present we already consider it possible for the tempo of
operations to be 100 km in a 24-hr. period and the duration of a
frontal operation to be 10 to 12 24-hr. periods. If this is so,
for how zany days are we preparing to wage war to achieve decisive
strategic results?
At present there is already a deep-seated contradiction between
de::nds to conduct operations on a large scale, at high tempos,
without pauses, and the still extant and accepted position regarding
the duration of the initial period of the war, which must continue.
to the end of full mobilization of forces and the beginning of the
receipt of material resources and arms from mobilized industry.
This is hardly realistic and apparently one must calculate on a
short initial period of the war, which will be the decisive period
of the entire war.
There is no need to fear the term "blitzkrieg" 3ust because