III-018 “The Theory of Military Art Needs Review,” by Col. Gen. A.I. Gastilovich and Lt. Gen. I.A. Tolkonyuk, special collection of Military Thought, top secret issue No. 1, 1960, CIA/DP Clandestine Report Special Collection, 18 December 1961,

'.(a '
this concept was compromised by the experience of past world ars.
Under the conditions of nuclear war only "blitz" operations can
promise victory. If victory is not achieved in a short time, then
peoples will hardly be able to continue it in a slow, drawn-out
fashion, especially the peoples of capitalist countries, who have a
lower moral - political potential than countries of the Socialist
Canmp. He who has withstood the ftrst strikes rust and can codclude
the war rapidly if he prepares his armed forces properly in peace-
time.-
Strategic art cannot be replaced by urgent demands on the moral
fiber of peoples, and neither can one plan strategy on the basis of
fear of calculated risk a the sacrifices connected with.it.
The enemies of blitzkrieg habitually argue that our World ir II
losses of 1/3 of all military industry, half of the steel and coal
production, 40 percent of petroleum production and output of electric
power, more than half of all the rail lines and several tens of
millions of the population in territory occupied by the enemy, not
counting cobat losses, not only did not bring about cessation of
prolonged reaiatance but even permitted the crushing of the German
fascist blitzkrieg plan and subsequently the achievement of a
brilliant victory. -
They forget the fact that the above-noted losses were spread out
over a period of almost two yearn. They were inflicted only along
the lino of the front and within its limits; in the zone of interior -
- they were almost non-existent. Hunan losses at the front and in the
rear were not afforded the necessary medi.cal and other aid available -
to millions of the wgounded and sick of the local populace. The
.nhabitants situated behind the line of the front were physically
almost unaware of these losses, since life in the rear continued to
flow more or less normally. The picture will be entirely different
now. i
Under present conditions, the possibility of victory must be
asured by readiness, the capacity and capability of concluding the
war in the shortest possible time. The theory of a prolonged wr
is more acceptable at present to the moopolistic. circles of the
West, since.the preparation for such a war costs more 'a' d conocquentl
" pronises the annufacturers of arms greater profits. 'An in the name
. of profits they ay not even consider the expediency of 'the theory.
The postulates of our military strategy concerning the size of
the armed forces are also still based on the experience. of past -
world wars and arise from the necessity of conducting war with ase,
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