III-018 “The Theory of Military Art Needs Review,” by Col. Gen. A.I. Gastilovich and Lt. Gen. I.A. Tolkonyuk, special collection of Military Thought, top secret issue No. 1, 1960, CIA/DP Clandestine Report Special Collection, 18 December 1961,

1.3 )(4)
VGX missile troops completely change the nature of operations of
ground troops, the navy, and aviation.
It would be naive to think that the enem will be incapable of
delivering similar powerful nuclear strikes against the territory of
countries of the Socialist Cap and first and forcmOst against the
territory of the Soviet Union. But such strikes ill not be able to
knock these countries out of the war.
The superiority of the socialist structure with its economic
potentialities and political unity of peoples .ill enable countries
of the Socialist Cimp to withstand the first nuclear strikes of the
enc~y. Tpia is further favored by the enormous territory, the
inorhbuotible human rescurces, and a relatively great dispersion of
industrial and adminitrative centers: The imporialist bloc does
not have cuch poasibilities. pr this reason, in preparing the
country for the possible launching of war by a67essors, we must first
of all utilize the advantages of our socialist system so as not to
give the encmy the possibility of recovering after our retaliatory
nuclear strike.
Of course we must take into account the consequences of the
first poworful enemy nuclear strikes. As it appears to us, they
will mke themselves felt first of all, by the fact that in the -
- first operation of the initial period of the war, a substantial rein-
-forccent of troops in theaters of military operations cannot be
expected by bringing up forces and equipment frcu the depth of the
country.
Under these conditions, it appears absolutely necessary to us
to review seriously certain tenets of our military strategy con-
cerning the length of a contemporary war and the number of armed
forces participating in it.
'Ihe exarple of the capitalist countries annihilated in the
-- first days of the war will hardly evoke enthusiasm in the remaining
countries for its prolongation. We auat take into account the
- norious roral shock to peoples, not to spcak of the hmge mterial
looca and the humn victims. It is suffioient to coare figures
of human losses in previous wars with expected losses during the
course of the first days or even the first hours of a conterporary
war for the pieture to become clear.
The losses of 33 warring countries during the four years of
World Mr I totaled 10 =mllion persons killed and 34 million persons
I.3(a)t4