III-018 “The Theory of Military Art Needs Review,” by Col. Gen. A.I. Gastilovich and Lt. Gen. I.A. Tolkonyuk, special collection of Military Thought, top secret issue No. 1, 1960, CIA/DP Clandestine Report Special Collection, 18 December 1961,

1.3(a) 4)
100 such nuclear chargos, dotonated within a short period of time on
an industrially d'eveloped country dhone territory is approxiastely
300-500 thousand square kilo::ters, trill be sufficient to convert
e~ll of its industrial arase and adtainistrative-political centers
into a heapof 'rubble, and the territocry -- into a lifeless desert
contaminated with deadly radioactive substatices."
* It must be ele r to everyone that such statements are not made
for the sake of rho oric, but are fully spbstauntiated from the stand-
point of the achiev mei4t of military technology and of the -econmic
capability of ,ur c . try.
-Under contemp ry conditions, the foa2tions of misasil troops
of the VC (Suprc High Condind), with their unliited range c
action and coloaoal force of fire strike, have becomz thd. prirory
and decisive form armed forces. They, rather than any other .
mans of armed conf et "pave the way," if one msay use the expression,
for all other forms armed forces, radically changing the "
- strategic situation a a Whdole and the operational situation in the
theaters of military operations. -
The efforts of a other forms of the armed forces, thi are -
equipped with nuclear/missile eapons, must be directed toward
" ximum rapid and effective exploitation of the strikes of missile
formations of the VGK. In this connection, the basis for planning
" operations of each of the types of forces again becomes a question
of the use of their own nuclear/missile weapons, and not of the
number of divisions, vessels, aircraft, etc. .
From these considerations it is already completely apparent
that a whole series of established views of our military doctrine
muat be seriously reexmined, beginning with questions of strategy -
and operational art and ending with tactics and troop organizatioa.
. i.
-- Some Questions of Stratey
Let us examine some questions concerning the initial period
of war. It us inngine NATO without two-three countries which
- have been taken. out of the war by means of a powerful nuclear/
missile strike of formations of the VQ or which have even ceased
to exist in the first days of the war. Thia -is, after all, a
completely realistic perspective; let us remember incidentally,
that the area of each such country is significantly Less than 300
thousand square kilometers and several tens of large nuclear missiles
are sufficient for its destruction. - Naturally, such operations'by.
- -3-