Contribution to NIE 11-14-64 Capabilities of Soviet General-Purpose Forces 1964-70, CIA/DI/ORR, 6 October 1964

been overcome easily by conscripting men aged 20 and 21 who had not
previously been in service. In fact, the surpluses over requirements
in the years 1959 and 1960 could have provided conscripts in sufficient
number to have maintained the military and security forces at the esti-
mated mid-1959 levels through the years mid-1960 to mid-19 6 4. In our
judgment, therefore, the impact on the conscription system of the decline
in birth rates during World War II was not sufficient reason alone for
the USSR to have reduced its military force level below that of mid-
1959. Q
Some pressure on the conscription system was noted in mid-1962,
when the USSR appeared ready to induct men 18 years of age during the
following year. Evidence shows that, although begun, induction of this
group in 1963 was stopped before the processing was complete. Instead,
requirements evidently were met by reducing the number of men deferred
from the 19-year-old group. Assuming that our estimates of the force
levels are approximately correct, these moves would have been unneces-
sary unless the number of men available for conscription was less than
that shown in Table 1.
Sh'Duld the USSR wish to reduce the level of military manpower,
however, 1964 is believed to be a most advantageous year. The ratios
between the number of men in the conscript classes now in service are
quite uneven. More than 40 percent of the conscripts are in the class
of 1961, which is being replaced in 1964. The USSR is believed to
prefer that about one-third of the conscripts be in each of the three
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