Documents / FOIA release
This is a CIA Office of Research and Reports contribution to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-64, dated 6 October 1964, on the capabilities of Soviet general-purpose forces from 1964 to 1970. It updates evidence on Soviet doctrine for theater warfare, the effect of low wartime birth rates on military conscription and the labor supply, tactical missile systems, the Soviet and Satellite tactical air forces, and Soviet naval submarine, surface and air forces. The report does not mention unidentified flying objects.
TOPKCRET L As shown in Table 2, further reductions in the force levels are estimated to have taken place by mid-1960 and mid-19 6 1, with an increase by mid-1962. A plateau at the mid-1962 level is estimated for mid-1963 and mid-1964. Given the distribution of conscript classes that existed in mid-1959, the estimated force levels would have required conscription of classes in the numbers shown in Table 3. Table 3 Annual Requirements for Soviet Conscripts Implied by Estimated Force Levels 1959-64 Year Thousand Persons 1959 760 1960 68o 1961 1,100 1962 760 1963 680 1964 1,100 Most Soviet conscripts are inducted at age 19. As shown in Table 1, the number of men aged 19 in 1961 and in 1962 probably was insufficient to satisfy the requirements for conscripts at the estimated force levels and may be insufficient in 1964 if no reduction has been initiated. The total shortage for 1961 and 1962 as shown by our data probably was the range of about 150,000 to 250,000. The number of men available in 1959 and 1960 greatly exceeded the requirements estimated for those years, however, and the deficit in 1961 and 1962 could have -9- TOP .ECRET
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 53 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.