/specialCollection/SovietandWarsawPact/1961/1961-12-18.pdf

111. S E C\E 7 '
this concept vas compromised by the experience of past world vars.
Under the conditions of nuclear war only "blitz" operations can
promise victory. If victory is not achieved in a short time then
peopleswill hardly be able to continue it in a slow, drawn-Cut
fashion, especially the peoples of capitalist countries, who have a
Lower moral - political potential than countries of the Socialist
Owsp. He who has withstood the first strikes eust and can =Maude
the wer rapidly if he prepares his armed forces properly in pesce-
lame.
Strategic art maw& be replaced by urgent demands co the moral
fiber of peoples, and nelt.ler can cue plan strategy oa the basis of
fear of calculated risk an& the sacrifices comected with it.
The ensmies or blitzkrieg hatiitwi123 ergo*that our 1d r IX
lamas of lh of all military imdestry, half of the steel and coal
production, 40 percent of petrol production and outset of electric
power, More than half at all the rail limaand several tem of
millions of the pc:gelation in territory occupied by the enamor, Sot
counting Combat losses not only &idea bring about cessation of
proloaged resistance bet even peraitted the crushigg of the German
fascist blitzkrieg plan and subsegnently the achievement of a
brilliant victory. •
They forget the fact that the above-noted losses were spread out
over a period at almost two years. !Wears inflicted only ale%
the line at the front and within its limits; in this same or interior
they sirs almost mon.exiitent. Mamas losses at the frost and in the
rear were not afforded the necessary Radical and other aid available
to 411iof the wounded and sick or the local *guises. The
Inhabitants situated 'behind the line of the treat were physically
almost unaware of these losses, since life in the teat continued to
flow mote or lees normally. She picture will be entirely different
now.
Oader present cooditioes, the possibility of victory must be
assured by readiness, the capacity and capability of concludies the
war in the shortest possible time. The theory or a prolonged vet
la more acceptable at present to the maaOpolistie.eircles of the
West, sincedhe pragmatics for snobs ‘ar costs erre Mod moseenently
promiees the mmufacturers drum greeter profits-. Aral in the name
of protits they why mot eves consider the mediae, at the theory.
Ms postulates of our military strategy 000ceralms the sise of
the armed taroas are also still, based an the experieuee of pest
world ems and arise from the necessity at conduatimg; mar with mass,
dem r,o0rirentatwirir..a..
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