Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency memorandum to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, dated December 1961, sends a verbatim translation of a Soviet article from the TOP SECRET version of the journal Military Thought. The article, "The Theory of Military Art Needs Review" by Colonel-General A. Gastilovich, appeared in the first 1960 issue. It argues that nuclear missiles call for short "blitz" wars, smaller ground forces and missile troops as the main arm. It has no UFO content.
4- • SEC "OM.. mimed, i.e., an average of 11 millioo persons per of 72 earring countries during the six years of Vorbi War II totaled about 34 million persons killed and 28 sillies' persona maimed, or an average also of about 11 pillion peruse per year. According to the data of a special study VI the Office of Civil Eefense of the USA conducted in 1955, the losses in the course of several hours from the first aerial attack carried out chiefly by atomic and thermo- nuclear weapon totaled 15 million persons dead end about 24 million persons sick and. wounded, altogether up to 40 million in the USA alone. In addition, about 50 to 60 percent of the country's industry vas destroyed. It is vell to note that in the above-menticoed study only 53 cities were aub3euted to the pre-armumedattack and that thermonuclear boles vere dropped on only 11 of these cities. The morel fatigee of peoples, which became evident toward the end of World War I as well of World lir II, is well known. It is easy to imagine hoarsest this fatigue and depression will be after the first nuclear strikes in a fnture var. It appears to ms !bit after the first ancleariadmile st*Ikes, the basis for all operatic= an a strategic seals emit be a decisive offensive against the yet =recovered enemy; the more quickly and energeticellythat this is accomplished, the more prcbable that the enemy vill he usable to cope with the disruptionlavagt about by the first attack, and to organise stublemmireeistence. Mewls withstands the first enemy attack must conclude the ear rapidly. At present we already comsider it possible for the tempo of operations tab* 100 km ID e 24-br. parted and the 'matins of a frontal operation to be 10 to 12 2k-b. periods. If this is so, for bow many days are we prepar'ng to vale ear to achieve decisive strategic results? At present there is already a deep-seated ccetrediatice !rousse demands to conduct operations on a large scale, at high tempos, ilthont Imes, and the still extant and accepted position regarding the duration of ...‘4 initial perioda the var, ditch must centi end me to the uo! full mobilisation of forces and the begimalms or the receipt of material resources and arse tram mdbilleed imiestsy. This is hardly realistic and apparently one must colev/mte on a short initial period of the mar, ehich TUX be the decisive period at the entire var. !bare is no mead to fear the tens "blitzkrieg" jest because
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 28 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.