Documents / FOIA release
This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.
TOP SECRET 4 ment program is discussed in paragraphs 16-20 below. (Paras. 81, 93) 13. Simplicity and ruggedness have been major criteria in Soviet development of ballistic missile systems from the short range to the ICBM classes. All systems probably employ radio-inertial guidance, achieving operational accuracies of about one-half to two n.m. depending on the range of the system. All use nonstorable liquid propellants except the 150 n.m. missile which uses storable liquid propel- lants. Short and medium range Soviet missiles are designed for road mobility and rail transportability. The ICBM, and probably the IRBM, are designed to be launched from fixed positions, and would be heavily dependent on the Soviet rail net. Medium range, IRBM, and ICBM systems are suitable primarily for the de- livery of nuclear payloads, but short range systems may be designed to employ nu- clear, HE, or CW warheads, depending on tactical considerations. (Paras. 84-94) 14. Our evidence on Soviet production and deployment of these missile systems is far from satisfactory. We have infor- mation pointing to several plants which may be engaged in production of ballistic missiles, but it is insufficient to establish production rates for any class of missile. Test range activities indicate the training of troop units to employ short and me- dium range systems, as well as continued research a'rid development to improve the performance of the systems themselves. Our best evidence on deployment relates to medium range missiles: some 700 n.m. missiles are probably now deployed in East Germany; 700 or 1,100 n.m. missiles are probably also deployed in the several areas near Soviet borders in the Baltic, Carpathian, and Far Eastern regions. (Paras. 88, 90, 92) 15. Our evidence on future Soviet ballistic missiles is likewise fragmentary and in- conclusive. We believe that the Soviets will strive to improve the accuracy, re- liability, ease of handling, mobility, and reaction times of all classes of missiles. Among other things, this effort probably will lead eventually to solid or storable liquid propellants and to all inertial guid- ance. (Para. 95) ICBM Program 16. We have relatively firm evidence on the Soviet ICBM test range and the test- firing program from which we have been able to derive basic characteristics of the ICBM system and—though with some probable margin of error—basic factors affecting its performance under opera- tional conditions. In the 31/2 year period since the first successful flight test in Au- gust 1957, the Soviets have launched about 35 generally successful ICBMs on the test range. Considering the observ- able patterns in test firing in relation to other Soviet missile programs and to the space program which has shared ICBM boosters, facilities, and experience, we conclude that the USSR has been con- ducting a careful and generally successful ICBM development program, at a deliber- ate pace rather than on a "crash" basis. (Pares. 98, 102-105) 17. The sum of our information is incon- clusive as to the precise timing of initial Soviet ICBM deployment. However, we consider that the satisfactory develop- ment of a 5,000 n.m. ICBM by the end of 1959, the probable manufacture of pro- duction missiles beginning early in that
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.