Documents / FOIA release
This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.
000278407 year, and the possible construction of launching sites in northwestern USSR in 1957-1959 are sufficient to support an estimate that as of about 1 January 1960 the first operational Soviet ICBM unit was trained and equipped with a few mis- siles and launchers. This is referred to as initial operational capability (IOC) date. We believe that since that time, the USSR has had at least some capability to launch ICBMs, with high-yield nuclear war- heads and good accuracy and reliability, against targets in the US.' ' (Paras. 124- 129) 18. For extensive coverage of US territory, 5,000 n.m. ICBMs would have had to be deployed at launch sites in northwestern USSR or in the Soviet Far East. By about mid-1960, however, the Soviets had de- veloped a 7,000 n.m. missile which could achieve full coverage of the US from de- ployment areas virtually anywhere in the USSR. ICBM launch sites would neces- sarily be near rail lines. (Paras. 101,110, 124) The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, De- partment of the Army, believes that by early 1960, the Soviets had developed a 5,000 n.m. missile satis- factory for emergency deployment to interim ICBM launch facilities and that a few missiles possibly were deployed to such facilities. He believes that an IOC with fully developed, deployed, operational missile launch facilities did not occur in 1960. 'The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intel- ligence), Department of the Navy, believes the So- viets probably had an emergency capability to launch a few missiles from test facilities (as opposed to operationaj launch sites) starting early in 1060. Factors which bear against a deployed operational ICBM capability and which are mentioned in the estirne weigh heavily in his judgment. These in- clud he lack of ICBM troop training activity, and the lac of firm evidence on operational ICBM sites. In addition, the first appearance of what appears to be an operational type site at Area C at Tyuratam which was estimated to be completed in late 1960 or early 1961 leads him to Judge that operational launch sites were not available before that time. 19. We estimate that, with the present type of guidance, Soviet ICBMs would have a CEP' of about two n.m. under op- erational conditions in mid-1961, but the actual figure could be considerably great- er or somewhat less. If a very high prior- ity is assigned to improving accuracy, the operational CEP of portions of the Soviet ICBM force might reach one n.m. as early as 1963, but we regard 1965 as a more likely date for such an achievement. (Paras. 112-113) 20. Although it will probably continue to be modified and improved over the next few years, the present Soviet ICBM has the inherent disadvantages of a very large, nonstorable liquid-fueled system. It is probable, therefore, that the Soviets will develop a new ICBM system using either storable liquid or solid fuels, build- ing into it compatible elements to increase flexibility and decrease vulnerability in deployment. Flight-tests of a follow-on ICBM system could begin at any time„ and we believe that such a system could become operational in about 1963 or after. (Paras. 131-133) Long Range Aerodynamic Vehicles 21. There are indications of current So- viet interest in long range, cruise-type ve- hicles. We believe that the Soviets are developing, and could have available for operational use by 1962-1963, a ground- launched, ramjet propelled vehicle, with a speed of about Mach 3, a flight altitude of approximately 70,000 feet and a range in excess of 4,000 n.m. This system could have a research role, but if employed for weapon delivery or reconnaissance it 'Circular error probable (CEP) is the radius of a circle within which theoretically 50 percent of the missiles reaching the general vicinity of the target will Impact. TOP SECRET
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.