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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1961/1961-04-25.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 101 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.

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tions, the guidance system could probably
handle two targets at a time, with more than
one missile in the air against each target.
However, these targets would have to be
within the approximate 12° radar look angle
of the FRUIT SET. The SA-2 system prob-
ably is somewhat less vulnerable to counter-
measures than the SA-1.
41. The missile used with the SA-2 system is
the GUIDELINE, first observed in the Novem-
ber 1957 parade (see Figure 11). It prob-
ably has a solid propellant booster and a
liquid sustainer motor, which give it a maxi- •
mum speed on the order of Mach 3. The
GUIDELINE carries a payload of about 500
pounds, and CEP is estimated at about 100
feet. Maximum intercept range is estimated
at 25-30 n.m. but will vary depending upon
type of target, approach angle, and other op-
erational factors; for example, against a di-
rectly incoming, high-flying B-52, the range
would be on the order of 25 n.m. Maximum
effective altitude capability is about 60,000
feet with some effectiveness up to 80,000 feet,
especially with a nuclear warhead. Low alti-
tude capability probably will average about
2,500 feet, but variations in siting conditions
and targets could result in low altitude limits
as high as 7,000 feet or as low as 1,000 feet.
42. Each SA-2 site is believed to be assigned
12 missiles, of which six are probably avail-
able on launchers and six are kept on trailers
parked in missile hold areas at each site. In
addition, for each 4-6 sites, there is a support
facility in which 12 more missiles per site are
uncrated, prepared, checked out, and held in
storage on trailers ready to be moved to indi-
vidual sites. Unassembled missiles are also
stored in the facility. A nearly completed
field support facility has been observed at
Ladeburg, northeast of Berlin (see Figure 12).
Sites of a more permanent nature, but per-
forming the same functions, have been
observed throughout the USSR (see Figure
13). They contain assembly and checkout
facilities, additional facilities for unloading
and disassembly, storage areas for warheads,
boosters, fuzes, fuel, and oxidizer, and a park-
ing area for ready missiles stored on trailers.
Although we have not identified nuclear stor-
age at any of the support facilities, we esti-
mate that the system could employ nuclear
warheads.
43. The firing scheme of the SA-2 site is not
known. There is some evidence that missiles
may be launched in pairs, but it is also pos-
sible that they are launched singly. In either
case the tracking and guidance equipment
would be tied up for the approximate one
and a half minute time of missile flight. Sub-
sequently another missile or pair of missiles
could be launched. Since reload z...nd check-
out are estimated to require approximately
five minutes, the first launcher or pair of
launchers would be ready to fire reloaded mis-
siles just prior to (in the case of a single
missile) or shortly after (in the case of pairs)
the last on-launcher missile. This situation
applies to the six misaes on launcher and the
six additional ready missiles at the site. The
time required to bring additional missiles from
the support facilities, generally located at
some distance from the sites, would depend
upon their relative locations and the extent
of prior planning.
44.The SA-2 system appears designed to cope
with the threat posed by small numbers of
aircraft carrying nuclear weapons rather than_
a massed raid threat. Flexibility and mobility
are its chief advantages over the SA-1. In
contrast to the massive SA-1 sites, each of
which is capable of defending only a limited
sector around the target area, each SA-2 site
appears capable of 360 degrees coverage. The
SA-2 system can, at relatively low cost, be
deployed widely for defense of large cities, of
small but important fixed facilities, and of
forces in the field. This flexibility is obtained
at the expense of target handling and rate of
fire relative to the SA-1. However, the shorter
time of flight of the boosted GUIDELINE mis-
sile gives the SA-2 system a better capability
against high altitude and high speed targets
and against targets with small radar cross
„sections.
45. Although all of the observed sites incor-
porate revetments and other fixed installa-
tions, all components of the system are
mounted on wheeled vehicles and are capa-
ble of independent movement by road or rail.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.