Documents / FOIA release
This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.
C00278407 TOP SECR-E-T-- 11 tions, the guidance system could probably handle two targets at a time, with more than one missile in the air against each target. However, these targets would have to be within the approximate 12° radar look angle of the FRUIT SET. The SA-2 system prob- ably is somewhat less vulnerable to counter- measures than the SA-1. 41. The missile used with the SA-2 system is the GUIDELINE, first observed in the Novem- ber 1957 parade (see Figure 11). It prob- ably has a solid propellant booster and a liquid sustainer motor, which give it a maxi- • mum speed on the order of Mach 3. The GUIDELINE carries a payload of about 500 pounds, and CEP is estimated at about 100 feet. Maximum intercept range is estimated at 25-30 n.m. but will vary depending upon type of target, approach angle, and other op- erational factors; for example, against a di- rectly incoming, high-flying B-52, the range would be on the order of 25 n.m. Maximum effective altitude capability is about 60,000 feet with some effectiveness up to 80,000 feet, especially with a nuclear warhead. Low alti- tude capability probably will average about 2,500 feet, but variations in siting conditions and targets could result in low altitude limits as high as 7,000 feet or as low as 1,000 feet. 42. Each SA-2 site is believed to be assigned 12 missiles, of which six are probably avail- able on launchers and six are kept on trailers parked in missile hold areas at each site. In addition, for each 4-6 sites, there is a support facility in which 12 more missiles per site are uncrated, prepared, checked out, and held in storage on trailers ready to be moved to indi- vidual sites. Unassembled missiles are also stored in the facility. A nearly completed field support facility has been observed at Ladeburg, northeast of Berlin (see Figure 12). Sites of a more permanent nature, but per- forming the same functions, have been observed throughout the USSR (see Figure 13). They contain assembly and checkout facilities, additional facilities for unloading and disassembly, storage areas for warheads, boosters, fuzes, fuel, and oxidizer, and a park- ing area for ready missiles stored on trailers. Although we have not identified nuclear stor- age at any of the support facilities, we esti- mate that the system could employ nuclear warheads. 43. The firing scheme of the SA-2 site is not known. There is some evidence that missiles may be launched in pairs, but it is also pos- sible that they are launched singly. In either case the tracking and guidance equipment would be tied up for the approximate one and a half minute time of missile flight. Sub- sequently another missile or pair of missiles could be launched. Since reload z...nd check- out are estimated to require approximately five minutes, the first launcher or pair of launchers would be ready to fire reloaded mis- siles just prior to (in the case of a single missile) or shortly after (in the case of pairs) the last on-launcher missile. This situation applies to the six misaes on launcher and the six additional ready missiles at the site. The time required to bring additional missiles from the support facilities, generally located at some distance from the sites, would depend upon their relative locations and the extent of prior planning. 44.The SA-2 system appears designed to cope with the threat posed by small numbers of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons rather than_ a massed raid threat. Flexibility and mobility are its chief advantages over the SA-1. In contrast to the massive SA-1 sites, each of which is capable of defending only a limited sector around the target area, each SA-2 site appears capable of 360 degrees coverage. The SA-2 system can, at relatively low cost, be deployed widely for defense of large cities, of small but important fixed facilities, and of forces in the field. This flexibility is obtained at the expense of target handling and rate of fire relative to the SA-1. However, the shorter time of flight of the boosted GUIDELINE mis- sile gives the SA-2 system a better capability against high altitude and high speed targets and against targets with small radar cross „sections. 45. Although all of the observed sites incor- porate revetments and other fixed installa- tions, all components of the system are mounted on wheeled vehicles and are capa- ble of independent movement by road or rail. TOP SECRET
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.