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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1961/1961-04-25.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 101 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.

1"-e-P-8-E-e-R-E-T-- 12
Not. considering travel time, we estimate that
about four hours is required to take down or
to set up the equipment at a site. Mobility
exercises have been observed in East Germany.
46. In view of the widespread deployment of
the SA-2 system and the potentialities for
further improvement, we consider it very un-
likely that the Soviets will develop an entirely
new system to improve their capabilities
against aircraft and air-to-surface missiles.
Rather, we estimate that the Soviets will prob-
ably improve the SA-2 to increase its range to
say 30-35 n.m., improve its ability to engage
small, fast targets at high altitudes, and en-
hance its ECCM capabilities. Research and
development work for this purpose may be
underway at Sary Shagan or Kapustin Yar,
and we believe that modifications incorporat-
ing improvements in the system could begin
to appear this year.
Low Altitude System
47. A surface-to-air missile system designed
to engage targets at low altitudes has prob-
ably been under development by the Soviets
for two or three years. Photography of Ka-
pustin Yar in late 1959 revealed a test area
(see Figure 14) which contained two sites of
a new type, each having four launch pads.
One site, which was probably used for R and
D, was complete and occupied, while the other
was in the final stages of construction. The
lack of revetments around the sites would
allow the launchers to be trained at a low
angle of elevation. Moreover, the loca-
tion of the guidance radar on a tower
indicates its design for use against targets
at low altitudes. At least one of the R and
D launchers contained two missile-like objects
about 20 feet long. The site pattern suggests
that the missiles are carried on a transporter
(possibly tracked) which backs up to the
launcher for transfer of the missiles. The
missile is believed to employ semiactive radar
homing all the way as a guidance system. It
is probably powered by a solid propellant en-
gine of the integral sustainer-booster type. .
48. This system, designated SA-3, probably
will become operational in 1961. We estimate
that it will have a minimum altitude capa-
bility of about 50 feet under optimum siting
conditions, a maximum altitude capability of
40,000-60,000 feet, a maximum range of 12-15
n.m., a 20 foot CEP, and a 300 pound HE or
nuclear payload.° The system probably will
be mobile, and thus suitable for defense of
field forces as well as fixed targets. It prob-
ably will employ a continuous wave radar for
target tracking. The acquisition radar has
not yet been identified, but existing radars
have a potential for use with this system. The _
SA-3 system probably will be deployed so as
to supplement existing SA-2 defenses.
Estimated payload weight is based upon analysis
of photography and the estimated availability of a
compatible nuclear warhead.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.