Documents / FOIA release
This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.
600278407 TOP CECnBT 10 against a directly incoming B-52 at high alti- tude its range is on the order of 20 n.m. Al- though probably designed for an altitude ca- pability of up to 60,000 feet, the missile should have some effectiveness up to about 80,000 feet, particularly if armed with a nuclear war- head. Its minimum effective altitude is about 3,000 feet.6 35. There is some evidence that the GUIDE- LINE missile, designed as part of the SA-2 system, may be utilized in some SA-1 sites as a replacement for the single-stage V-301. The use of such a boosted missile in the SA-1 systern would increase the system capability, particularly against targets which can be en- gaged for only a short time. 36. We have considerable information on pro- duction and logistic' support for the SA-1 sys- tem. Production of components and subas- semblies has been reported at a number of plants in the Moscow and Leningrad areas. Direct logistic support for the Moscow sites is provided by six assembly, storage, and main- tenance facilities located near the inner ring and connected to the launch sites by high- ways (see Figure 6). 37. The chief advantages of the SA-1 system are its ability to handle simultaneously a large number of targets and to direct an extremely high rate of fire against them. However, it was apparently designed primarily to counter the massed air raid threat of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Even before completion of the deployment around Moscow, it is probable that concepts of the threat had changed and that other defense techniques were consid- ered more appropriate. Moreover, the limited azimuth coverage of each site makes the sys- tem rather inflexible, and in its present con- figuration "It is completely immobile. The magnitude of effort involved in its deployment probably also argued against its use in less critical areas. The Soviet answer to these problems was the development of the SA-2 system. • Annex E, "Estimated Present Nuclear Warhead Capabilities." (Limited Distribution) SA-2 38. We have considerably less information on the development cycle of the SA-2 system than on that of the SA-1; however, it does not appear to have been similarly compressed. Deployment of this system was delayed until prototype launching facilities were completed at Kapustin Yar and training was underway. Based on the expansion of these facilities ob- served in September 1957, we believe that the system had been proved and had become op- erational prior to the end of that year. More than 150 operational SA-2 sites have since been observed—primarily in the USSR, but also in some of the Satellites—and many more are believed to exist. Several SA-2 sites ob- served in the Moscow area probably are in- tended to supplement the SA-1 defenses. Such widespread deployment indicates selec- tion of the SA-2 as the standard Soviet SAM system for defense against medium and high altitude air attack. 39. A typical SA-2 site (see Figures 7 and 8) consists of six revetted launchers ar- ranged in a roughly circular pattern of about 500 feet in diameter and linked by serv- ice roads to facilitate loading. Inside the circle are a revetted fire control system_ and associated van-type trucks and trailers which probably house radar and computing equipment and power generators. Displaced several hundred yards from the other equip- ment are an acquisition radar, an IFF set, and three revetted missile hold areas. 40. The SA-2 guidance system, like that of the SA-1, is believed to be a command sys- tem using a track-while-scan radar. This radar, nicknamed. "FRUIT SET," consists of four separate antennas on a single, mobile mount (see Figure 9). Although the radar has a relatively narrow look angle, the entire mount appears capable of rotation about a vertical axis, and at least one of the parabolic dishes can move about a horizontal axis as well. Used in conjunction with the fire control radar is an acquisition radar, nick- named "SPOON REST" (see Figure 10). SPOON REST has also been widely de- ployed as a gap-filler radar in peripheral areas of the Soviet Bloc. Under optimum condi- TOP CECI1BT
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.