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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1961/1961-04-25.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 101 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.

CO0278407
TOP SECRET
DISCUSSION
I. SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES
29. The Soviets have developed relatively few
surface-to-air missile systems, each designed
to counter a specific threat, or take advantage
of scientific and technical advances to assist
in solving air defense problems. German as-
sistance gave a considerable impetus to the
early Soviet research and development in this
field, but made no significant contribution
after about 1949.
30. The major Soviet facilities for testing sur-
face-to-air missile systems and for training
troops in their use are located at the Kapustin
Yar missile test range (see Figures 1 and 2).
These are centered in a complex extending
over some 180 square miles which contains
four launch areas, associated instrumenta-
tion and support facilities, and an installa-
tion similar in appearance to known So-
viet nuclear weapons storage sites. Training
facilities probably can support 3,000 SAM
troops at any one time.
31. At the test range, the Soviets have fol-
lowed a generally similar pattern in the de-
velopment of the two SAM systems now opera-
tional. After extensive component develop-
ment and testing at research facilities, a large
flight test program was conducted at the test
range using a launching facility specifically
designed for research and development.
Subsequently, prototypes of operational sites
were constructed for more complete system
testing and for training of operational crews.
SA-1
32. This is the arbitrary US intelligence des-
ignation of the first operational Soviet SAM
system, which was deployed only in the area
around Moscow. In late 1949 or early 1950,
the development of this SAM system was
placed on a priority basis and development
time was telescoped. After testing on a par-
tial prototype site, construction of missile sites
at Moscow was begun in 1953, at about the
same time as the complete prototype site was
being constructed at Kapustin Yar. Deploy-
ment of the system was begun in 1954, and
the entire complex was probably operational
by 1956. At that time 56 sites had been de-
ployed in a dense and costly complex around
Moscow on two concentric rings with radii
approximately 25 n.m. and 45 n.m. from the
center of the city (.^c., Figure 3). A typical
SA-1 "herringbone" site has 60 launch posi-
tions joined by a road network (see Figure 4).
33. Preliminary tracking information prob-
ably is provided to the Moscow SAM defense
by radars which are deployed around the city
on a circle with a radius of about 200 n.m.
Closer in, about 30 n.m. from the outer ring,
a target would come within range of the
tracking radar located at each site. This
radar, designated "YO-YO" by US intern-.
gence, can simultaneously track targets and
scan for additional targets within a 54° arc
in both the vertical and horizontal planes.
Each SA-1 site is believed capable of engag-
ing as many as 20 targets simultaneously.
However, the limited coverage in azimuth
means that a number of sites are required
to defend a target against attack from all
quarters. The SA-1 employs a command type
of guidance system. It appears to be vulner-
able to both chaff and electronic jamming
to a degree which is heavily dependent upon
the jamming techniques employed and on the
skill of the SA-1 radar operator.
34. The V-301 missile originally designed for
use with this system is unboosted and employs
a liquid propellant sustainer motor (see Fig-
ure 5). While its maximum speed is on
the order of Mach 3.5, it has a low ini-
tial acceleration which limits somewhat its
engagement capability against supersonic tar-
gets. The missile carries a payload of about
500 pounds, and its CEP is estimated at 65-
120 feet. Maximum intercept range will vary
between 20-30 n.m. depending upon the ap-
proach and type of target; for example,
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.