Documents / FOIA release
This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.
TOP SECRET earth satellites suitable for supporting manned orbital flights; and, most re- cently, the successful orbiting and recov- ery of a man. (Para. 150) 26. The reliability achieved in Soviet space shots has been much lower than that of the Soviet ICBM. The Soviets have achieved 14 successful launchings of space vehicles, but we believe that there have been nearly as many launchings which resulted in failures. Moreover, sev- eral of the vehicles which were success- fully launched apparently did not func- tion as planned. Most space failures were apparently caused by factors unique to the space program, such as the addi- tion of upper stages to the basic booster and in some cases the requirement to launch at stipulated times. (Para. 152) 27. To date the USSR has apparently not launched any space vehicles specifically for military purposes. However, many of their space experiments have provided in- formation which would be useful in the development of future military space sys- tems. It would be technically feasible at present for the Soviets to equip earth satellites for such military support roles as communications, reconnaissance, nav- igation, or collection of weather data. We estimate that such systems could appear at any time. There is no evidence that the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. However, the Soviets have un- doubtedly undertaken research and stud- ies in this,area. Soviet success in space as exemplified by the Venus probe, the most recent successful orbiting and re- covery of a man, and the capability to orbit still heavier payloads over the next few years, leads to the conclusion that the Soviets are technically capable of achieving an orbital bombardment ve- hicle toward the end of the period of this estimate. Moreover, the Soviet leaders might seek to derive some psychological or political advantage by hinting or even boasting that the USSR had a significant capability in such weapons. The launch- ing of vehicles for which the Soviets claimed a military capability or other So- viet achievements in space could lend credence to such claims. (Paras. 149, 175) 28. We believe that the Soviets will con- tinue to capitalize on their possession of very powerful propulsion systems. The USSR could now place in orbit a 20,000 pound satellite, and this orbital payload could be increased to about 25,000 pounds in about 1962. An instrumented lunar - soft landing probably can be made this year, and additional deep space probes probably will be attempted during the next year or so. Finally, there is evi- dence that the Soviets are now developing a liquid rocket engine with a thrust of some one to two and a half million pounds which could be available in about 1963. Such engines could be used in clusters in the 1965-1970 time period to launch earth satellites of 50 to 100 tons. (Paras. 167- 174) TOP SECRET
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.