Documents / FOIA release
This is a report of investigation by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Inspector General, dated 18 July 2014. It covers Agency access to Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff files on RDINet, the network built for the Senate review of the rendition, detention and interrogation program. The report found that five Agency employees improperly accessed the SSCI Majority shared drive and that three IT staff lacked candor. It also found no factual basis for the CIA crimes report against SSCI staff.
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(b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(c) ## SECRET//NOFORN open the folder. recognized the documents as likely WCR reports based on their (b)(6) filenames and folder structure, and opened "a few" of the documents to view the first page, (b)(7)(c where he observed a disclaimer and format similar to the WCR documents. informed(b)(3) of the findings. briefed (b)(6) 25. (U//FOUO) On 10 January 201(b)(7)(c) tasks(b)(7)(c) to search the RDINet database to verify whether the SSCI had been provided access to the restricted documents. (b)(3) search of the database revealed that the documents were not located in the database(b)(6) and they concluded that they had therefore not been produced by the CIA to the SSCI for revie(b)(7)(c) Following search, conducted a search on the root of the RDINet shared drive, which contains all user profiles, user accounts, and shares used by both CIA and SSCI users. search indicated that the restricted documents were located on the SSCI Majority shared drive and one SSCI user's personal drive. navigated directly to the locations of interest on the SSCI Majority shared drive as well as to the SSCI user's personal drive. (b)(3) 26. (U//FOUO) During the course of the investigation, OIG received conflicting (b)(7)(c) statements from regarding additional accesses to the SSCI shared drive (b)(3) and subsequent screenshots taken during those accesses. According to following (b)(6) confirmation that the restricted documents were present on the SSCI Majority shared drive, (b)(7)(c) specifically requested access to the drive so that he could look at the documents (b)(3) himself. granted this access, associating the drive as workstation, for (b)(6) approximately 20 minutes. stated that, during this time, captured screenshots (b)(7)(c) of the SSCI Majority shared drive file structure. emailed the screenshots to requesting the screenshots be transferred to the ADN. According to however, he (b)(3) requested that come to his office, where provided access to the SSCI (b)(6) Majority shared drive from workstation. when interviewed, was unsure of (b)(7)(c) the methods used to grant the access and stated that helped take screenshots of (b)(7)(c) folders and sub-folders of interest on the SSCI Majority shared drive on his behalf. 27. (U//FOUO) OIG review of activity associated with RDINet user account(b)(6) on 10 Januarv 2014 showed attempts were made to access (b)(3) (b)(7)(c) (b)(3) Next, activity showed usage of (b)(3) (b)(3) followed by a Lotus Note to (b)(3) ADN. A review of (b)(6) personal storage drive on the ADN found a folder named (b)(3) which contained (b)(7)(c) screenshots related to searches of the SSCI Majority shared drive, home page, and “not authorized” messages. (b)(3) (b)(6) 28. (U//FOUO) provided the screenshots to and tasked (b)(3) to (b)(7)(c) determine if the restricted documents had been accessed by SSCI staffers. On 10 January 2014, (b)(3) (b)(6) OIG Case No. 2014-11718-IG (b)(6) 8 (b)(7)(c) (b)(7)(c) (b)(3) SECRET//NOFORN (b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(7)(c) (b)(6) (b)(7)(c) (b)(7)(c)
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 57 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.