Report of Investigation Agency Access to the Ssci Shared Drive on Rdinet

Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.

## SECRET//NOFORN

Agency information systems. Additionally, OIG did not find documentation that NDAs or security briefings were provided to or signed by the SSCI staff.

(U) Unauthorized CIA Access to RDINet and Related Taskings

22. (U//FOUO) During the course of the investigation, OIG found that in January 2014, five Agency officers exceeded authorized access or directed such access to the SSCI side of RDINet. These accesses were not conducted as part of IT administration or routine Agency monitoring, but as part of a CIA investigation into how SSCI staffers obtained copies of documents referred to as WCRs.	(b)(3)
	(b)(6)
23. (U//FOUO) the OGC attorney	(b)(7)(c)
	told OIG that
he became suspicious of an apparent security breach on the RDI system in December 2013.	(b)(6)
suspicious stemmed from letters from SSCI Chairman Feinstein and Senator Udall requesting copies of the “Panetta Review,” the latter of which Senator Udall used to explain the reason for delaying Caroline Krass’ confirmation hearing as CIA General Counsel.	(b)(7)(c)
supposed that the “Panetta Review” referred to SRT documents or WCRs that were created at the behest of then D/CIA Panetta. As a result, told OIG that he began to consider the circumstances of how SSCI could have obtained access to CIA documents that he considered to be inappropriate. Between late December 2013 and early January 2014, expressed his suspicions to and informed that the RDINet logs should be reviewed to determine how SSCI obtained access to the WCRs. OIG review of	(b)(6)
	titled
“Memorandum for the Record re: partial timeline of events surrounding discovery of SRT documents on RDI NET,” (“MFR”) (Exhibit F) which contained a timeline of events from his perspective. In this document, unilaterally reached the legal conclusion that he had the legal authority to task members of his staff to access the SSCI shared drive and look for Agency documents to which he believed the SSCI staffers were not entitled. stated that he tasked the IT team to look for SRT documents on the SSCI staff side on 9 January 2014.	(b)(3)
(U) RDI IT Team Review	(b)(6)
24. (C//NF) On 9 January 2014, after a discussion with directed to set up a user profile on RDINet that was configured with the same privileges as a SSCI Majority staff user. requested this access in order to run Google queries with the same permissions as a SSCI staffer to see what they were able to view in their search results. identified the presence of WCR reports on the SSCI Majority shared drive through a review of the Google search results. After identifying the documents, mapped to the folder where the documents resided and used his “dummy account” with his SSCI-like permissions to	(b)(7)(c)
	(b)(6)
7 (U//FOUO) was initially interviewed by OIG prior to the discovery of the MFR. Following the discovery of the MFR, declined to be interviewed about its contents.	(b)(7)(c)
	(b)(6)
OIG Case No. 2014-11718-IG	7

OIG Case No. 2014-11718-IG