Documents / Official release
This Defense Intelligence Reference Document, dated 8 March 2010, was prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense Warning Office under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program. It is one of a series of advanced technology reports. It surveys the history of space access concepts, covering hypersonic gliders, air-breathing and rocket propulsion, materials, launch options and operating costs. The report argues that reliable, schedulable access to low Earth orbit is mainly a hardware and organizational problem rather than a technology problem.
From the source: Release of 2026-09-18 Incident: 3/8/10, Las Vegas, Nevada. Released with redactions. This document is a Defense Intelligence Reference Document (DIRD), a technical reference format used by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to capture baseline knowledge on a specific topic for later analytic use. DIRDs are best understood as reference and synthesis products rather than as original research. It is one of 38 DIRDs produced under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP) between 2009 and 2011. Because AAWSAP’s scope permitted a broad range of supporting topics, not every DIRD in the series directly concerns aerospace systems or future threat assessment. The following summary reflects the DIRD’s scope and framing at the time of writing and should not be read as implying current validation of the concepts discussed. This DIRD is a historical and conceptual survey of space access systems, contending that the main barrier to routine access to space is a failure to build durable, reliable, operational hardware and the supporting infrastructure needed for regular service to and from low Earth orbit. The report reviews earlier launch and aerospace concepts, especially reusable and aircraft-like approaches, and suggests that U.S. space access development became too strongly centered on expendable rockets derived from ballistic missiles rather than bespoke systems designed for repeated space access and payload delivery. Its central claim is that meaningful future progress will depend on creating a purpose-built space transportation infrastructure, including frequent round-trip capability and orbital support networks, rather than continuing to rely on one-off launch vehicles. Overall, the document presents a forceful case for infrastructure-first space development, though its characterization of past technological choices is more assertive than a fully neutral account of past U.S. space programming.
UNCLASSIFIED/ ,«POil Offl@IAL YSli QPU,¥ veterans responded, "It was not a technology issue; it was a hardware issue." In a keynote address to the Aeronautical Revolutionary Concepts Workshop sponsored by the Vehicle Applications Panel of the National Research Council and held at NASA Ames in July 1984, then-Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Productivity, Technology, and Innovation Dr. D. Bruce Merrifield identified the problem of translating ideas into products as preparing technology for product manufacture. Dr. Merrifield drew an analogy between this step and Major League Baseball's farm system, which prepares skilled but untrained players for the major leagues. The United States assigns projects to accomplish technology tasks so the flow of production ready hardware is always improving and is not fixed (see Figure 1). Innovation Focus: Preparation of Technology for Application ---r-----7to10years-----~1 ------~--""••"_, ,__...;;.;.:, ----,....-=----_-_-_,---...,.._ "..........,•"- _ .....:.., .. --"'"'--... ........... .. ·····•.. ,••· ' •, .. Prototype .... Idea Generation.______., .______, PrOCluct and Pilot lntenm + Commercialization ·. Develooment Plant I Manufacture lnve~n Translation ··•.... ··•. ••······· ...•••· •.................. ................•1:i:t··fA••·····••..................... ROLP Gap in effective No Gap in100/o Cost 900/o Cost preparation for transformation application to production in United States Or.O. Bruce Merrifield Oeptment of Commerce 1983 Innovation In Aeronautics Assistant Secretary for Productiv ity, Wortcshop, NASA AMES Technology and Innovation Figure 1. Hardware Flow Saturn I and Saturn V could be readied for a moon flight in such a short time because most of their hardware was based on a frozen design, proven production processes, and adaptation of existing hardware. Using a similar approach, current industrial capabilities can create the next practical system for accessing space. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the U.S. Air Force was working toward an operational capability analogous to its B-52 fleets: flight operations when required or "on demand." After NASA was assigned UNCLASSIFIED/ /iOA: OiilCIOls. n&li Qfslls.¥ vi
Not linked to a story yet.
Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 56 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.