AAWSAP DIRD, Space Access: Where We’ve Been and Where We Could Go, March 2010

This Defense Intelligence Reference Document, dated 8 March 2010, was prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense Warning Office under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program. It is one of a series of advanced technology reports. It surveys the history of space access concepts, covering hypersonic gliders, air-breathing and rocket propulsion, materials, launch options and operating costs. The report argues that reliable, schedulable access to low Earth orbit is mainly a hardware and organizational problem rather than a technology problem.

From the source: Release of 2026-09-18 Incident: 3/8/10, Las Vegas, Nevada. Released with redactions. This document is a Defense Intelligence Reference Document (DIRD), a technical reference format used by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to capture baseline knowledge on a specific topic for later analytic use. DIRDs are best understood as reference and synthesis products rather than as original research. It is one of 38 DIRDs produced under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP) between 2009 and 2011. Because AAWSAP’s scope permitted a broad range of supporting topics, not every DIRD in the series directly concerns aerospace systems or future threat assessment. The following summary reflects the DIRD’s scope and framing at the time of writing and should not be read as implying current validation of the concepts discussed. This DIRD is a historical and conceptual survey of space access systems, contending that the main barrier to routine access to space is a failure to build durable, reliable, operational hardware and the supporting infrastructure needed for regular service to and from low Earth orbit. The report reviews earlier launch and aerospace concepts, especially reusable and aircraft-like approaches, and suggests that U.S. space access development became too strongly centered on expendable rockets derived from ballistic missiles rather than bespoke systems designed for repeated space access and payload delivery. Its central claim is that meaningful future progress will depend on creating a purpose-built space transportation infrastructure, including frequent round-trip capability and orbital support networks, rather than continuing to rely on one-off launch vehicles. Overall, the document presents a forceful case for infrastructure-first space development, though its characterization of past technological choices is more assertive than a fully neutral account of past U.S. space programming.

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Space Access: Where We've Been . . . and Where We Could
Go
Introduction
Development of commercial access to space by our budding space
faring civilization is a straightforward effort dominated by
propulsion and reliability. The initial focus should be on schedulable,
dependable access to and from low Earth orbit (LEO). For years we
have known the means to accomplish such a task but have lacked a
dedicated organized effort. The key requirement is to develop a
robust and not necessarily a low-cost infrastructure, without which
commercial exploitation of LEO and the moon will not be possible.
This is a matter of skill; operational hardware based on durable,
reliable, and demonstrated components; and operational systems. It
is not necessarily a matter of technology. However, technology
discovery and development are necessary for future space travel
beyond Earth's environs. This paper addresses these issues by
providing a running account of the historical details associated with
the development of the myriad systems proposed and tested to
provide access to space.
Among the many advances in space access that will be possible in
the future,1 the key technology developments will be in the area of
propulsion, because without these we are confined to our solar
system by flight times limited to a project team's functional life. The
Pioneer spacecraft were fortunate to be monitored for 20 years.
However, the issue facing our spaceflight organizations is the lack of
a durable, consistent, schedulable, and frequent hardware system to
and from space assets such as the International Space Station.
In October 1958, the author's job in the vertical wind tunnel at
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base abruptly changed; hypersonic and
high-temperature flows became a new focus. What was then the
Aircraft Laboratory was to become the Air Force Flight Dynamics
Laboratory (AFFDL), with a focus on space flight. Al Draper of the
AFFDL began working with a select group of aerospace firms on
hypersonic gliders. The initial requirement from the Air Force was to
quickly find operational access to space. Technology application,
hardware design and fabrication with an innovative application, and
extending the industrial capabilities of the time were very much the
issue, as exemplified by the Lockheed A-12/SR-71. When asked
about space access at the time, a group of Aerospace Corporation
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