Documents / Official release
This Defense Intelligence Reference Document, dated 8 March 2010, was prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense Warning Office under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program. It is one of a series of advanced technology reports. It surveys the history of space access concepts, covering hypersonic gliders, air-breathing and rocket propulsion, materials, launch options and operating costs. The report argues that reliable, schedulable access to low Earth orbit is mainly a hardware and organizational problem rather than a technology problem.
From the source:Release of 2026-09-18 Incident: 3/8/10, Las Vegas, Nevada. Released with redactions. This document is a Defense Intelligence Reference Document (DIRD), a technical reference format used by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to capture baseline knowledge on a specific topic for later analytic use. DIRDs are best understood as reference and synthesis products rather than as original research. It is one of 38 DIRDs produced under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP) between 2009 and 2011. Because AAWSAP’s scope permitted a broad range of supporting topics, not every DIRD in the series directly concerns aerospace systems or future threat assessment. The following summary reflects the DIRD’s scope and framing at the time of writing and should not be read as implying current validation of the concepts discussed. This DIRD is a historical and conceptual survey of space access systems, contending that the main barrier to routine access to space is a failure to build durable, reliable, operational hardware and the supporting infrastructure needed for regular service to and from low Earth orbit. The report reviews earlier launch and aerospace concepts, especially reusable and aircraft-like approaches, and suggests that U.S. space access development became too strongly centered on expendable rockets derived from ballistic missiles rather than bespoke systems designed for repeated space access and payload delivery. Its central claim is that meaningful future progress will depend on creating a purpose-built space transportation infrastructure, including frequent round-trip capability and orbital support networks, rather than continuing to rely on one-off launch vehicles. Overall, the document presents a forceful case for infrastructure-first space development, though its characterization of past technological choices is more assertive than a fully neutral account of past U.S. space programming.
UNCLASSIFIED/ /POil OFFIEiIAk Ulilii QPIL¥ Figure 14 compares the glide ranges and L/D ratios of selected hypersonic gliders. The shuttle would be in the area of the nominal wing body on the righthand chart. From Figure 13, the no-waiting cross range (lateral range) is 3,600 to 4,400 nautical miles. That means the hypersonic L/D ratio needs to be in the 2.7 to 3.2 range. Appendix D has down and lateral ranges shown as landing ellipses. The key to a successful landing is a subsonic L/D ratio that is in the 4.5-or-greater range. The NASA round-bottom configurations were not capable of that subsonic L/D ratio. The X-24B was in that category and was therefore easily landed compared with the X-24A or Prime vehicles. These high-performance gliders were unique to the AFFDL. The intent in case of a fire would be to immediately evacuate to the hypersonic gliders and then depressurize the station to control any fire (remember that Mercury and Gemini could be depressurized). A crew could then be launched to recover the operation and repair the station. j ·e o::: IC ei a 30000 •· 20,0CJ0 1----+---+---,..,,...--i1----i1---1 Nominal Lifting Body 10,000 1----1■ --------+-----I 0 .....,___..___.___...___..____..____ 4.0 T MDC data 2.0 t---t----t--:::~ -t-'---+---1 1.0 ~ =--....-. 1----1--- Apollo + Par 0 0 2,000 4,000 6,000 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 Lateral Ran e (nau tical miles) Su sonic UD Figure 14. Hypersonic Glider Characteristics There is always the question about landing these blended bodies. Figure 15 shows the blended body handling qualities to be very good, and therefore a pilot's fear factor is less than with the X-15. Bill Dana said the X-24A was difficult to handle when landing but that he could land the X-24B almost with no hands as it flared automatically . To the author's knowledge, all of the wind tunnel tests showed inherent static and dynamic stability over the entire speed range. UNCLASSIFIED/ /FOR AEEJCJOL flilii QPIL¥ 15
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 56 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.