AAWSAP DIRD, Space Access: Where We’ve Been and Where We Could Go, March 2010

This Defense Intelligence Reference Document, dated 8 March 2010, was prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense Warning Office under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program. It is one of a series of advanced technology reports. It surveys the history of space access concepts, covering hypersonic gliders, air-breathing and rocket propulsion, materials, launch options and operating costs. The report argues that reliable, schedulable access to low Earth orbit is mainly a hardware and organizational problem rather than a technology problem.

From the source:Release of 2026-09-18 Incident: 3/8/10, Las Vegas, Nevada. Released with redactions. This document is a Defense Intelligence Reference Document (DIRD), a technical reference format used by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to capture baseline knowledge on a specific topic for later analytic use. DIRDs are best understood as reference and synthesis products rather than as original research. It is one of 38 DIRDs produced under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP) between 2009 and 2011. Because AAWSAP’s scope permitted a broad range of supporting topics, not every DIRD in the series directly concerns aerospace systems or future threat assessment. The following summary reflects the DIRD’s scope and framing at the time of writing and should not be read as implying current validation of the concepts discussed. This DIRD is a historical and conceptual survey of space access systems, contending that the main barrier to routine access to space is a failure to build durable, reliable, operational hardware and the supporting infrastructure needed for regular service to and from low Earth orbit. The report reviews earlier launch and aerospace concepts, especially reusable and aircraft-like approaches, and suggests that U.S. space access development became too strongly centered on expendable rockets derived from ballistic missiles rather than bespoke systems designed for repeated space access and payload delivery. Its central claim is that meaningful future progress will depend on creating a purpose-built space transportation infrastructure, including frequent round-trip capability and orbital support networks, rather than continuing to rely on one-off launch vehicles. Overall, the document presents a forceful case for infrastructure-first space development, though its characterization of past technological choices is more assertive than a fully neutral account of past U.S. space programming.

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The author was aware of three people-James S. McDonnell, the AFFDL's Albert Draper,
and Russia's Glebe Lozino-Lozinski-who clearly understood the need for a long cross
range and down-range capability, not just for one missed orbit. Critics will observe that
Lozino-Lozinski had limited his BOR vehicles to an L/D ratio of 1. 7 to 1.8 and not the
2.7 to 3.0 required for Earth circumferential glide range. First, the longitudinal extent
of the former Soviet Union was twice that of CONUS, and an Earth circumferential glide
range was not necessary to ensure recovery within the continental Soviet Union;
therefore, a lesser L/D ratio was acceptable. Second, in personal conversations with
the author, Lozino-Lozinski indicated a Russian government agency forced him to limit
the glide range to ensure recovery in continental Russia and prevent escape to the
United States. In a further step to prevent escape, when the vehicle was in range of
CONUS, ground control disabled its deorbit system .
The need for a long cross-range and down-range capability so there is no waiting in
orbit in the case of an emergency or military need is presented graphically in Figure 13.
Interestingly, the greatest lateral-range (cross-range) requirement for no waiting is for
55° orbital inclination, the usual Russian orbital inclination. The nominal U.S. orbital
inclination is 28.5 degrees, with a waiting time of 8 orbits (approximately 12 hours) for
a space shuttle-class glider. At the International Space Station orbital inclination, the
orbital waiting time for a shuttle-class glider is 6 orbits. In comparison, Apollo's orbital
waiting time was about 14 orbits, provided the return trajectory included an Earth
parking orbit before entry into the Earth's atmosphere. The FDL-7 and Model 176 class
of gliders could immediately enter a return glide from their orbits. This provides a
significant advantage for the International Space Station operators and vehicle crew,
who need only enter hypersonic gliders attached to an orbital station and initiate
deorbit procedures to be on the ground in less than 90 minutes in an emergency.
Time (orbits) Required to Land in Cal ifornia or Fl orida
Orbital Altitude is 200 nautical miles, 230 .1 statute miles, 370.4 km
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