Documents / Official release
This Defense Intelligence Reference Document, dated 8 March 2010, was prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense Warning Office under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program. It is one of a series of advanced technology reports. It surveys the history of space access concepts, covering hypersonic gliders, air-breathing and rocket propulsion, materials, launch options and operating costs. The report argues that reliable, schedulable access to low Earth orbit is mainly a hardware and organizational problem rather than a technology problem.
From the source: Release of 2026-09-18 Incident: 3/8/10, Las Vegas, Nevada. Released with redactions. This document is a Defense Intelligence Reference Document (DIRD), a technical reference format used by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to capture baseline knowledge on a specific topic for later analytic use. DIRDs are best understood as reference and synthesis products rather than as original research. It is one of 38 DIRDs produced under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP) between 2009 and 2011. Because AAWSAP’s scope permitted a broad range of supporting topics, not every DIRD in the series directly concerns aerospace systems or future threat assessment. The following summary reflects the DIRD’s scope and framing at the time of writing and should not be read as implying current validation of the concepts discussed. This DIRD is a historical and conceptual survey of space access systems, contending that the main barrier to routine access to space is a failure to build durable, reliable, operational hardware and the supporting infrastructure needed for regular service to and from low Earth orbit. The report reviews earlier launch and aerospace concepts, especially reusable and aircraft-like approaches, and suggests that U.S. space access development became too strongly centered on expendable rockets derived from ballistic missiles rather than bespoke systems designed for repeated space access and payload delivery. Its central claim is that meaningful future progress will depend on creating a purpose-built space transportation infrastructure, including frequent round-trip capability and orbital support networks, rather than continuing to rely on one-off launch vehicles. Overall, the document presents a forceful case for infrastructure-first space development, though its characterization of past technological choices is more assertive than a fully neutral account of past U.S. space programming.
UNCLASSIFIED/ /FOR OFFI@IAL l:ISE OHL¥ goal was to be able to recover the spacecraft at any airport in CONUS, to eliminate the need for an overseas recovery site, and to eliminate the waiting required until a lower L/D ratio could land in CONUS (up to 14 orbits for the Apollo capsule, or 21 hours). In an emergency, that may be too long. The AFFDL's goal for the spacecraft to support the Manned Orbiting Laboratory was no waiting but to be able to reach CONUS from any arbitrary MOL position in its orbit. This was considered possible in the 1964-65 briefs to the government with respect to MOL, specifically the Model 176 configuration the MDC proposed for the MOL support in 1964. The hypersonic glider based on the FD L- 7C and the hypersonic air-breathing aircraft in Figure 8 both have hypersonic L/D ratios in excess of 2. 7. In very practical terms, that means unpowered cross ranges in excess of 4,500 nautical miles and down ranges on the order of the Earth's circumference. So these two craft can depart from any location of a low-altitude orbit and land in CONUS or in continental Europe. Both are dynamically stable over the entire glide regime. FDL-7 CID Hypersonic Glider Bl ended Body Hypersonic Cruiser Figure 8. High-Performance Hypersonic Glide Aircraft. Rocket boost-gl ide and air-breather cruiser. The wing-body, cylindrical fuselage advocates have strongly criticized the lifting bodies, contending that they are poorer configurations and much more complicated than the conventional-wisdom wing-body configurations (see Figure 9). However, that is far from the truth . The structural specialist sees this configuration as a lightweight propellant tank and assumes it is t his consideration that drives the design. Rather, that observation introduces problems for all other technical disciplines that are far more difficult to rectify than a noncylindrical tank or a cylindrical tank in a nonsymmetrical cross section. The lone lifting surface with t railing edge controls introd uces control issues just as it did for the space shuttle. UNCLASSIFIED/ ;'POlt err1e1J1tt U.!I!! er~t I 10
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 56 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.