AAWSAP DIRD, Space Access: Where We’ve Been and Where We Could Go, March 2010

This Defense Intelligence Reference Document, dated 8 March 2010, was prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense Warning Office under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program. It is one of a series of advanced technology reports. It surveys the history of space access concepts, covering hypersonic gliders, air-breathing and rocket propulsion, materials, launch options and operating costs. The report argues that reliable, schedulable access to low Earth orbit is mainly a hardware and organizational problem rather than a technology problem.

From the source: Release of 2026-09-18 Incident: 3/8/10, Las Vegas, Nevada. Released with redactions. This document is a Defense Intelligence Reference Document (DIRD), a technical reference format used by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to capture baseline knowledge on a specific topic for later analytic use. DIRDs are best understood as reference and synthesis products rather than as original research. It is one of 38 DIRDs produced under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP) between 2009 and 2011. Because AAWSAP’s scope permitted a broad range of supporting topics, not every DIRD in the series directly concerns aerospace systems or future threat assessment. The following summary reflects the DIRD’s scope and framing at the time of writing and should not be read as implying current validation of the concepts discussed. This DIRD is a historical and conceptual survey of space access systems, contending that the main barrier to routine access to space is a failure to build durable, reliable, operational hardware and the supporting infrastructure needed for regular service to and from low Earth orbit. The report reviews earlier launch and aerospace concepts, especially reusable and aircraft-like approaches, and suggests that U.S. space access development became too strongly centered on expendable rockets derived from ballistic missiles rather than bespoke systems designed for repeated space access and payload delivery. Its central claim is that meaningful future progress will depend on creating a purpose-built space transportation infrastructure, including frequent round-trip capability and orbital support networks, rather than continuing to rely on one-off launch vehicles. Overall, the document presents a forceful case for infrastructure-first space development, though its characterization of past technological choices is more assertive than a fully neutral account of past U.S. space programming.

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designed, weighed, and performed using the same industrial fabrication capability. The
result was a curve representing each configuration family, as shown in Figure 7. The
three families are represented by the three parallel straight lines.
SV FAMILY
1.5
10
•
w
0.5
W - W • (1 L/DJ- 0 +11 .1
- - -
~-----
MRS FAMILY
0 1 2 3
Hypersonic LID
Figure 7. Detailed Design Analyses Show the Weight Trends are as Much a Function of Configuration
Family as Lift-to-Drag Ratio
W/W0 = K{l+0.090l!(L/D)]
K =1.000 for the SV Family (3)
K =0.9297 for the FDL Family
K =0.7622 for the MRS Family
This illustrates that the configuration and its individual wetted area to planform area
can vary as much in their spacecraft weight as they can in their L/D ratio. The high
L/D-ratio configurations had weights comparable to same-payload ballistic capsules of:
sv = 1.9 FOL= 1.7 MRS =1.4
So the penalty for having a lifting-body configuration is less than expected if the
configuration characteristics are taken into consideration in the design and weighing of
the spacecraft. In addition, the reason the lifting spacecraft with high performance was
considered was to eliminate the need for sea recovery and therefore the cost of a
recovery fleet and the damage incurred by the spacecraft in a saltwater landing. The
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