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This final report, dated September 10, 1996, was prepared by the Research Triangle Institute for the Department of the Air Force's 45th and 30th Space Wing safety offices. Titled Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, it shows how rare Mode-5 failures, in which a rocket veers well off its intended flight line, are modeled in the DAMP risk-analysis program. An appendix lists Atlas, Delta, Titan and Thor launch and failure histories through August 1996.
From the source:Release of 2026-05-08 Incident: 9/10/96, N/A. This report describes the Modeling of Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, documenting historical launch failure modes and recommending corrective actions to address them using novel modelling techniques.
the other end. It is possible, however, to obtain fairly close agreement over sectors"' from ±80° to ±180°, as seen in Figure 9. Since for Atlas HAS there are few, if any, significant population centers in the launch area outside these sectors (i.e., within ±80° of the flight line), failure of the curves to match closely near the flight line is of little . consequence. If a better data match is considered desirable for computing risks to population centers within ±80° of the flight line (e.g., ships), either a different A can be selected for use with B = 1,000 or other values of A and B can be derived. If only a single value of B is used, no matter what the value, a good match between theoretical and simulated data is not possible over the entire 180° sector for various breakup qa.'s. Before becoming too concerned about lack of a data match between 0° and 80°, it should be remembered that many types of Mode-5 responses cannot be simulated, so that the malfunction-tum impact distributions plotted in Figure 9 are only a subset of all possible Mode-5 impacts. Based on twelve Mode-5 failure responses for. which impact data are available, it is believed that inclusion of the ''non-simulatable" Mode-5 responses would considerably improve the match in the sector from ±10° to ±80°. Another mitigating factor is that risks near the flight line are totally dominated by Mode-4 failure responses. To see how data matching is affected by selecting widely differing values of B, the theoretical Mode-5 impact distributions were computed for B =50,000, 100,000, 500,000, and 5,000,000. Best-fit values for A were again determined by trial and error. Results are shown in Figure 10 through Figure 13 along with the same impact distributions for random-attitude turns plotted in Figure 9. "' For other values of B and qa, close agreement is possible from ±60° to ±180°. 9/10/96 43 RT!
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Report, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 181 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.