PA-AARO RoundTableTranscript 11-15-24 (FOIA 25-F-3931)

those national security sites. And then eventually we'll be expanding our baseline investigations
to other areas in the U.S. to look at what normal looks like away from national security sites.
Q: And then, after the hearing on the Hill yesterday, lawmakers were saying that they are really
keen to meet in a SCIF with AARO officials, other DOD officials, whistleblowers and members of
Congress. Is that something you've been approached about, have done or are open to doing?
DR. KOSLOSKI: So we're absolutely open to meeting with everybody. We've been meeting with
a variety of folks, from whistleblowers through staffers. And we encourage anybody with direct
information to come to us, go to our secure reporting mechanism on the website. And when we
get that, we'll reach out to them, schedule a meeting in the SCIF.
And Congress has enabled us to receive all sensitive information regardless of classification or
NDAs they may have signed. And we receive that information. And we follow-up on every tip
that they provide us.
Q: Thank you.
DR. KOSLOSKI: Yes.
STAFF: Oren
Q: Two questions. One, I was wondering if you could talk about whether any analysis or data of
reports you have received has led you to the foreign adversary conclusion, specifically the UASs
-- 18 reports of UASs spotted near nuclear facilities? And then I was wondering if you could just
talk about the -- the -- the effort to increase engagement with foreign partners for a better -- a
broader array of sensors, data analysis information.
DR. KOSLOSKI: Sure. So, firstly, no, we have not been able to correlate any UAP activity to
adversarial collection activities or advanced technologies. I also want to make it clear that UAP
covers a lot of potential activity by its very nature. The definition is in the name, right? So it's
unidentified and it's anomalous. Once we know that it's a UAV or a UAS of some nature, we
then hand that responsibility off to one of our partners.
So Langley being a great example. It was known to be UAV activity, so we were there in a
supporting role, but it was not our responsibility to address that. So those investigations are
conducted by somebody else. And we're focusing on the truly anomalous where we don't
understand the activity. And then for the foreign engagement, we're working on increasing our
foreign engagement.
We recognize that UAP is not just going to be a domestic issue. The office has focused primarily
on U.S. government. And we're going to be growing to public reporting soon in 2025. And we're
going to be growing our international partnerships hopefully also in 2025. So starting with the
group that we have the most familiar -- familiarity with and then growing that from there.