Documents / Report
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued this preliminary assessment on 25 June 2021, as Senate Report 116-233 required. It reviews 144 U.S. Government reports of unidentified aerial phenomena from 2004 to 2021, compiled with the UAP Task Force. Only one case was identified with high confidence, as a deflating balloon. The report concludes that UAP pose a flight safety issue and possibly a national security challenge, and it calls for standardized reporting, more collection and more investment.
UNCLASSIFIED 4 UNCLASSIFIED AVAILABLE REPORTING LARGELY INCONCLUSIVE Limited Data Leaves Most UAP Unexplained… Limited data and inconsistency in reporting are key challenges to evaluating UAP. No standardized reporting mechanism existed until the Navy established one in March 2019. The Air Force subsequently adopted that mechanism in November 2020, but it remains limited to USG reporting. The UAPTF regularly heard anecdotally during its research about other observations that occurred but which were never captured in formal or informal reporting by those observers. After carefully considering this information, the UAPTF focused on reports that involved UAP largely witnessed firsthand by military aviators and that were collected from systems we considered to be reliable. These reports describe incidents that occurred between 2004 and 2021, with the majority coming in the last two years as the new reporting mechanism became better known to the military aviation community. We were able to identify one reported UAP with high confidence. In that case, we identified the object as a large, deflating balloon. The others remain unexplained. • 144 reports originated from USG sources. Of these, 80 reports involved observation with multiple sensors. o Most reports described UAP as objects that interrupted pre-planned training or other military activity. UAP Collection Challenges Sociocultural stigmas and sensor limitations remain obstacles to collecting data on UAP. Although some technical challenges—such as how to appropriately filter out radar clutter to ensure safety of flight for military and civilian aircraft—are longstanding in the aviation community, while others are unique to the UAP problem set. • Narratives from aviators in the operational community and analysts from the military and IC describe disparagement associated with observing UAP, reporting it, or attempting to discuss it with colleagues. Although the effects of these stigmas have lessened as senior members of the scientific, policy, military, and intelligence communities engage on the topic seriously in public, reputational risk may keep many observers silent, complicating scientific pursuit of the topic. • The sensors mounted on U.S. military platforms are typically designed to fulfill specific missions. As a result, those sensors are not generally suited for identifying UAP. • Sensor vantage points and the numbers of sensors concurrently observing an object play substantial roles in distinguishing UAP from known objects and determining whether a UAP demonstrates breakthrough aerospace capabilities. Optical sensors have the benefit of providing some insight into relative size, shape, and structure. Radiofrequency sensors provide more accurate velocity and range information.
Report, from the odni collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 9 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.