Documents / FOIA release
This Defense Intelligence Agency info memo, dated 13 November 2009, went to the Director of Special Programs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. It reviews Senator Harry Reid's request to set up a restricted special access program for the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Program contract, which Reid's letter calls AATIP. DIA found no adequate justification. The FY2009 deliverables were unclassified, and the reports held no information sensitive enough to need extra protection. DIA offered draft technical reports for review.
UNCLASSIFIED/.lfiljiloJtj DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5100 INFO MEMO NOV I 3 2009 FOR: DIRECTOR, SPECIAL PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE (b)(3):10 USC 424:(b)(6) FROM: Defense Intelligence Agency SUBJECT: (U) Review of Special Access Program Request (U/,T@H90~ This info memo responds to your request for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DlA)l(b)(3):10 USC 424 Ito evaluate a request from Senator Harry Reid (enclosure 1) to establish a restricted special access program (SAP) for the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Program Contract, referred to in Senator Reid's letter as the Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program (AAITP). In reviewing the deliverables to date and looking ahead to planned production in fiscal year (FY) 20 I 0, DIA cannot find adequate justification to establish a restricted SAP. (b)(3):10 USC 424 (U/.'liG' Hil) All program documents delivered to ~~during FY 2009 (the first year of the program) were unclassified because the contractor had not established a secure facility, and program employees were being vetted for clearances. 1n FY 20 I 0, most research products will remain at the unclassified level. However, four to six of the original technical reports will be expanded to included classified data. These reports will focus on foreign research in a particular technology area and will likely be derivatively classified at the secret level. Based on classification levels of current and projected program deliverables, there are insufficient grounds to classify this open program, invoke aitemative or compensatory control measures (ACCM), or establish a restiicted SAP. • (U//fQJJQ) Classifying the overall program by derivative means is impractical given Department of Defense Regulation, DoD 5200.1-R Information Security Program guidance: No reports produced thus far have extracted, paraphrased, or restated information obtained from previous] y classified material (para C3 .1. l ). Future reports that contain classified information will be marked and protected according to the original classification authority (para C3. l .2. l. l ). • (U/IY@l IC) Classifying the overall program by original means is inadvisable: Information contained in the reports 1s not owned by, produced by or for, or under control of the U.S. government (para C2.3.1. l). DIA cannot identify any damage that UNCLASSIFIEil'!.',liQLIQ
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FOIA release, from the dia collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 3 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.