Documents / FOIA release

U-09-2660CE IM Review Of Special Access Program Request

Defense Intelligence Agency · 3 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Defense Intelligence Agency info memo, dated 13 November 2009, went to the Director of Special Programs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. It reviews Senator Harry Reid's request to set up a restricted special access program for the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Program contract, which Reid's letter calls AATIP. DIA found no adequate justification. The FY2009 deliverables were unclassified, and the reports held no information sensitive enough to need extra protection. DIA offered draft technical reports for review.

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5100
INFO MEMO
NOV I 3 2009
FOR: DIRECTOR, SPECIAL PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE
(b)(3):10 USC 424:(b)(6)
FROM: Defense Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: (U) Review of Special Access Program Request
(U/,T@H90~ This info memo responds to your request for the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DlA)l(b)(3):10 USC 424 Ito evaluate a request from Senator Harry
Reid (enclosure 1) to establish a restricted special access program (SAP) for the
Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Program Contract, referred to in
Senator Reid's letter as the Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program
(AAITP). In reviewing the deliverables to date and looking ahead to planned production
in fiscal year (FY) 20 I 0, DIA cannot find adequate justification to establish a restricted
SAP. (b)(3):10 USC 424
(U/.'liG' Hil) All program documents delivered to ~~during FY 2009 (the first year of
the program) were unclassified because the contractor had not established a secure
facility, and program employees were being vetted for clearances. 1n FY 20 I 0, most
research products will remain at the unclassified level. However, four to six of the
original technical reports will be expanded to included classified data. These reports will
focus on foreign research in a particular technology area and will likely be derivatively
classified at the secret level. Based on classification levels of current and projected
program deliverables, there are insufficient grounds to classify this open program, invoke
aitemative or compensatory control measures (ACCM), or establish a restiicted SAP.
• (U//fQJJQ) Classifying the overall program by derivative means is impractical given
Department of Defense Regulation, DoD 5200.1-R Information Security Program
guidance: No reports produced thus far have extracted, paraphrased, or restated
information obtained from previous] y classified material (para C3 .1. l ). Future reports
that contain classified information will be marked and protected according to the
original classification authority (para C3. l .2. l. l ).
• (U/IY@l IC) Classifying the overall program by original means is inadvisable:
Information contained in the reports 1s not owned by, produced by or for, or under
control of the U.S. government (para C2.3.1. l). DIA cannot identify any damage that
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FOIA release, from the dia collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 3 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.