Documents / FOIA release
This is a June 24, 2009 letter from Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid to Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn III, released as a Defense Intelligence Agency record. In it, Reid asks Lynn to set up a Restricted Special Access Program with a bigoted access list covering parts of the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP). He says the program has produced highly sensitive, unconventional aerospace-related findings. An attachment gives a preliminary access list that names Bigelow Aerospace Advanced Space Studies contractors.
HARRY REID NEVADA Honorable William Lynn III Deputy Secretary of Defense 1010 Defense Pentagon Washington, DC 20301-1010 Dear Secretary Lynn: tlnitnl ~tatcs ~cnatc WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7012 June 24, 2009 MAJORITY LEADER Beginning this past September, the U.S. Senate has mandated that the Defense Intelligence Agency assess tar-term foreign advanced aerospace threats to the United States. The scope of program interest covers from the present out to forty years and beyond. In order to further our effort in recognizing emerging disruptive aerospace technologies, technical studies are being conducted in regard to advanced lift, propulsion, the use of unconventional materials and controls, signature reduction, weaponry, human interface and human effects. Since the Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program (AAITP) and study were first commissioned, much progress has been made with the identification of several highly sensitive, unconventional aerospace-related findings. Given the current rate of success, the continued study of these subjects will likely lead to technology advancements that in the immediate near-term will require extraordinary protection. Due to the sensitivities of the information surrounding aspects of this program, I require your assistance in establishing a Restricted Special-Access-Program (SAP) with a Bigoted Access List for specific portions of the AATIP. In order to support this national effort, a small but highly specialized cadre of Department of Defense (DoD) and private sector individuals are necessary. These individuals must be specialized in the areas of advanced sciences, sensors, intelligence/counterintelligence, and advanced aerospace engineering. Given the likelihood that these technologies will be applied to futme systems involving space flight, weapons, communications, and propulsion, the standard management and safeguarding procedures for classified information are not sufficient. Even the use of conventional SAP protocols will not adequately ensure that all aspects of the project are properly secured. Although not every aspect of AATIP requires Restricted SAP read-on, the following portions should be maintained at the Restricted SAP level: • The methodology used to identify, acquire, study, and engineer the advanced technologies associated with AATIP. o Specific methodologies used to study unconventional technology may require nuanced approaches that will undoubtedly be of significant interest if not a top priority for adversarial Foreign Intelligence Security Services (FISS).
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FOIA release, from the dia collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 4 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.