Documents / FOIA release
This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.
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# SECRET The concept of planning a post-Berlin permanent increase in the DOD budget is believed sound. The magnitude and character of that increase can be resolved as soon as the DOD submission is at hand; further questions of Congressional consultation can then be considered. In principle, this seems sound. The real questions arise in connection with scale and timing. It is suggested that the basic course of action be approved, subject to continuing decisions by the Secretary of State as to scale and timing. 4. Defense Mobilization and Civil Defense Measures. An Annex to this report includes recommendations on defense mobilization and civil defense. These recommendations will need to be coordinated with the Department of Defense before decisions on them can be taken. 5. Economic Countermeasures. No new decisions are now required. Inter-Allied planning for economic pressures on the Bloc is well underway. If and as this planning generates need for Presidential decisions, these decisions will be sought. 6. US Economic Dislocations. If early, large-scale and dramatic military preparations are to be undertaken, fears of war and prospective shortages could lead to hoarding, scare buying, and price increases in the absence of controls. If the program is a gradual and modest build-up not specifically keyed to the Berlin crisis, on the other hand, no severe inflationary problem may arise. Decisions about economic controls should thus be postponed until it has been decided on what scale military preparations are to go forward. 7. Public Information. An Annex to this report outlines a proposed public information program. One specific component of this program calls for decision: the proposal for an early Presidential speech, to be made shortly after publication of the US reply to the Soviet aide-memoire. No further decision seems needed to launch this information program; the USIA and the Department of State should do so immediately. 8. Negotiations. An Annex to this report outlines possible alternative U.S. negotiating positions. Decisions on these alternatives can be
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.