Documents / FOIA release
This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.
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## SECRET after blocking of our access before proceeding to ground action, and even if it is concluded that large-scale and dramatic preparations would be counter-productive in their effect on Soviet intentions. In any event, the choice should be based on a systematic analysis of the political and military implications of alternative levels of early mobilization and of the concomitant actions which we would like our Allies to undertake and their probable reactions. The attached paper was put together so quickly that no time was avail able for the Departments of State and Defense to prepare such an analysis. One specific point to be covered in any decision on military preparations is whether now to request an additional $3-5 billion for the DOD FY 62 budget, before the Senate Appropriations Committee passes on that budget. It might well be desirable to do this, even if it is decided not to initiate immediate large-scale mobilization. This increase could be presented to the public as our response to the over-all world situation, rather than to an acute Berlin crisis - both to minimize the psychological impact on the US economy referred to in the Treasury-CEA submission and to avoid seeming to dramatize an ostensible challenge to the Soviets over Berlin. 2. The DOD Budget. The NSC June 30 Directive called on the Secretary of Defense to submit recommendations concerning the magnitude and character of a permanent long-term increase in the size of the US defense establishment (i) which might be planned now in addition to any preparations to enhance specific Western capabilities for fighting over Berlin; and (ii) which might be executed, if and when Soviet actions regarding Berlin (e.g., blocking of access and resisting Allied forces) seemed to foreshadow a long period of greatly heightened world tensions. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State were also asked to submit recommendations concerning actions that might be taken to bring the prospect of this planned increase to the Soviets' attention. The object of this course of action would be to deter Soviet pressures on Berlin, by convincing the USSR that such pressures could lead to a lasting step-up in US defense expenditures, such as followed the Korean War. (Since that step-up would not be begun until late in the crisis, it would probably not take effect in time to improve our fighting capabilities for dealing with that crisis.) The DOD response to this part of the Directive was still in preparation when this report was assembled. Defense representatives at the 13 July meeting hope to be able to present proposals. The concept
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.