Warsaw Pact Air Forces: Support of Strategic Operations in Central Europe, CIA/DI/SOVA Intelligence Assessment, January 1985.

Top Secret
Appendix C
Force Ratio Analysis
The Soviets' military writings indicate that their the Central European air balance using the Soviets'
planners take force ratio norms into consideration combat potential scores, neverthcless, are generally
when they decide which of their employment concepts consistent with their perceptions of the balance as
are most appropriate for a given situation and when expressed in their military writings
- they try tocrcatcan-o.timum disposition of forces. In
writings| the force ratio calculations arc Warsaw Pact Air Forces Participants. We use four
made by multiplying each side's order of battle by a different Pact force dispositions in our calculations-
set of static weapon system combat potential scores. a baseline estimate and three sequential air reinforce-
These scores represent a rough approximation of the ment packages that are consistent witi :ovict
relative ability of each weapon system to inflict losses logistic considccrations:
on the enemy. They were developed by the Soviet
General Staff, which used linear formulas in conjunc- The baseline force, Force JF-2S. reflects a minimal-
tion with small- and large-scale models of combat ly reinforced posture that comprises three front air
operations. The Soviets consider the resultant force forces and two strategic air armies. These are the
ratios a simple and effective way to compare the air forces of the Polish-GDR, Group of Soviet
combat potential of similar types of technically ad- Forces, Germany (GSFG)-GDR, and Czechoslo-
vanccdforces. vak-Central Group of Forces (CGF) fronts and the
Legnica and Smolensk strategic air armies. This
The Soviets' writings in the early 1980s indicated that force also includes the Baltic Fleet air forces and the
they were researching more advanced ways to esti- second-echelon non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP)
mate force balances-which probably will lead, as in interceptors-although it is likely that these inter-
the past, to the adoption of a new method for using ceptors would participate only in an air defense
combat potential scores. One proposal involved mea- operation and not in the air operation.
suring the degree of achieved air superiority by
contrasting the balance between NATO air forces and - The second force, Force 3F-3S, adds an indepen-
Pact air defense forces with that between Pact air dent air force element-the Vinnitsa strategic air
forces and NATO air defense forces. Interest also has army-which requires considerable logistic support
been expressed in more complex methods that would but not nearly as much as would be needed to move
include a comparison of the capabilities of the oppos- up an entire front. We chose not to add a detached
ing sides' integrated air and ground forces. This would front air force from a second-echelon front to this
allow calculation of the effect of relative air superior- force because its use could result in sufficient
ity on ground combat. We have no evidence that aircraft attrition to seriously impair the front's
either of these more advanced methods has yet been fighting ability before its commitment to battle.
implemented; we have therefore conned our calcula- this is probably
tions to a simple homogeneous forces application. the Soviets' preference for committing reserve front
air for,.cs to battle. It also is consistent with their
military writings, which state that the main reason
Counting Assumptions for disestablishing the numbered tactical air armies
Our ability to confidently calculate air balances that in 1980 and 1981 was to fully integrate front
fully reflect Soviet perceptions is constrained by our aviation into the joint forces fronts. We also did not
incomplete understanding of how and which forces use Moscow strategic air army Bears or Bisons in
would be counted and of Soviet estimates of the range
of likely reinforcement scenarios. Our calculations of
69 Top Secret