Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
oioSE ret The Numbers of Nuclear Strikes In sum, we estimate that the Soviets would plan for We have no direct evidence concerning the number of the delivery of about 75 percent of the Smolensk air nuclear strikes that the Soviets would expect the army's nuclear strikes in the Western TMO. There- Smolensk air army to deliver during the first major fore, about 135 of the 180 aircraft in this air army strike or what portion of those strikes would be that probably would be tasked for nuclear weapons conducted in the Western TMO. On the basis of delivery would attempt to conduct strikes there. These Soviet planning practices in front aviation, we esti- 135 aircraft would carry about 290 (240 to 320) of the mate that probably only the aircraft from squadrons 390 (320 to 430) nuclear weapons that the Smolensk with primary strike roles normally would be tasked to air army would be tasked to deliver in the European deliver nuclear weapons, and a portion of the aircraft theater of war in those squadrons probably would be used instead to conduct supporting conventional defense suppression attacks and to augment the dedicated reconnaissance aircraft." We estimate that perhaps 25 percent of the strike aircraft would be used in support roles- possibly 10 percent for defense suppression and 15 percent for reconnaissance. Considering likely opera- tional readiness rates, the remaining 75 percent would number about 180 aircraft, assuming no prior attri- tion. We lack evidence concerning typical Soviet nuclear weapon loads for-bombers and the number of strikes that would be planned for the Smolensk air army. Our minimum estimate is derived by assuming that all 180 strike aircraft are armed with the one or two ASMs that constitute their basic missile loads. In our higher estimate, we assume that half of the bombers instead carry three bombs apiece. These calculations produce a range of about 320 to 430 nuclear weapons. Our best estimate is that about one-third of the strike aircraft would carry bombs and that a total of about 390 wca _ would be used by the Smolensk air army. Top Secret 68
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.