Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
Tolp<Se ret Figure 3 The Likely Distribution of Ground Attack Aircraft Combat Potential in the Western Theater of Military Operations- Percent Force Components - Aircraft Types ------ Polish-GDR Front Baltic Fleet 8 10 h1, Attack helicopters GSFG-GDR Front Legnica Air Army 29 Medium bombers .7 15i 29 Smolensk Air Army Fightcr-bombers Light bombers 20 26 16 Czechoslovak-CGF Front to aThesecalculations-were-derivedby using theSovietmethodof estimating the relativecombatpnential of combataircraft.Weassumea force disposition in the WesternTMo that includesthree first.echelon fronts andfull use of the Smolenskair armybut no participation by the vinnitsa or Moscow air armies. 303433 (tC0065t 84 specified to accomplish each stage would correspond defeating NATO's AFCENT and BALTAP forces. to the number of days the General Staff believed it These theater-level missions would include: should take the ground forces to occupy that particu- - Conducting air defense operations and conventional lar territory. offensive air operations to achieve and maintain strategic air supremacy in the TMO and blunt Limited evidence NATO's nuclear capabilities. uggests that the first - Participating in the first major nuclear strike in the strategic operation in the Western TMO would proba- theater (which the Soviets call the initial massed bly have as its first-stage objective the defeat of the nuclear strike). main forces of AFCENT and BALTAP and the - Mounting subsequent offensive air operations occupation of the mid-European strategic zone and against various key NATO rear area forces and the Danish Straits in about two weeks' time. The installations. subsequent defeat and occupation of France in about Participating in major airborne operations. another two weeks may constitute a typical second- - Supporting amphibious landing operations. stage task (figure 5). Providing strategic air reconnaissance in support of the General Staff and the Western high command. Air Forces Missions The Warsaw Pact air forces would be tasked by the Western high command to directly support its plan for Top Secret 8
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.