Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence assessment, dated January 1985, examines how Warsaw Pact air forces would support large strategic operations in Central Europe. It concludes that the Soviets see NATO air power as the greatest threat to a Pact ground offensive. They revised their air supremacy plans in 1980 and 1981 to use sector-concentrated raids and a defensive air operation. The assessment also finds that heavy aircraft losses and limited deep attack capability would remain serious problems. The document has no UFO content.
Top Scret Strategic Air Armies. The Legnica strategic air weapon-system-specific combat potential scores. In a army-a light bomber force-is the only air army force disposition with three front and one flect air that is likely to be assigned in its entirety to the forces and the Legnica and Smolensk strategic air Western high command for most of any strategic armies, for example, the Soviets would perceive that operation. The medium bombers of the Smolensk collectively the two strategic air armies would contrib- strategic air army probably arc intended to support ute less than one-fifth of the ground attack aircraft operations in the entire European theater of war, but but more than one-third of the ground attack combat we estimate tha, about two-thirds to three-fourths of potential (see figure 3). Commitment of these strategic their sorties would probably be committed to the aviation forces would allow the Western high com- Western TMO (see appendix B for further discussion). mand to quickly concentrate substantial firepower in The Fencer ligh' bombers of the Vinnitsa strategic air any sector of the TMO to support either theaterwide army also could be assigned to the Western TMO. or individual front objectives. The three front air The addition of this large number of strategic aviation forces would provide over half of the air forces' light bombers, however, wo-ld place greatly increased ground attack combat potential in the Western demands on the Pact's forward basing capabilities TMO-more than two-thirds of which would be because, according to Soviet operational planning concentrated in the TMO's most important, central norms, the Fencer would not be able to cover tarcts Soviet-GDR front. Within each of the three front air in Western Europe from bases in the USSR forces, as the Soviets calculate, attack helicopters our analysis of Soviet would contribute slightly more combat potential than force requirements suggest that the Vinnitsa strategic fixed-wing ground attack aircraft. While the front air air army probably would be committed to the West- forces would provide extensive direct support to the ern TMO for the first few days of the war and then strategic objectives of the Western high command, transferred back to the Southwestern TMO under most of their efforts are intended to be spent in direct most circumstances in a general war (see appendix C support of front and army objectives after the first for our force requirement analysis). Some heavy days of the war (thereby contributing indirectly to the bombers from the Moscow strategic air army also attainment of strategic objectives). could be used to attack distant targets in Britain and France during conventional operations, Strategic Operations Soviet military writings and exercises indicate that Other Air Forces. Other aircraft supporting strategic the Commander in Chief of the forces in the Western operations in the Western TMO would include East TMO could be directed by the Supreme High Com- European national air defense fighter-interceptors, mand to conduct a series of strategic operations, each naval aviation, and Soviet long-range transport air- of which probably would be divided into two stages. craft. The national air defense fighter-interceptor The main objectives in each stage might include the forces of the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland- occupation of the territory of particular political- possibly reinforced by a couple of Soviet regiments- economic "strategic zones"' (figure 4). The time would in some cases operate in territorial.air defense formations and in other instances serve as part of the ' The NATO side of the Western TMO isconceptually divided by first-echelon fronts. Naval aircraft would be used the Soviets into four land "strategic zones" and at least threecontiguous water "strategic zones." These zonesare mid-Europe primarily to support the Combined Baltic Sea Fleet, (thc FRG. Dcnmark the Nethertands, and Belgium), France, and large commitments of aircraft from Soviet Mili- Iberia, Britain, the Danish Straits, the English Channel, and tary Transport Aviation-a strategic reserve force- Gibraltar. The Soviets apparently also consider the GDR, Czecho- slovakia, and Poland to constitute another strategic zone on thewould be required during airborne operations. Pact side of the TMO. For planning, the Soviets divide each of the strategic zones into a series of main and secondary "operational axes," which constitute the anticipated sectors of major operations Combat Potential. The Soviets' perception of their by front or army joint force formations. force disposition in the Western TMO would include an assessment of relative combat power, arrived at by multiplying their order of battle by a set of simple 7 Top'Secret I
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.