Documents / FOIA release

Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

op
Avionics Trends in Warsaw Pact Figure il-11 capable of conducting combat operations past the
Tactical Aircraft Opposite NATO, Rhine. Today, large numbers of Pact tactical aircraft
1969 and 1979 can operate well into France and the Benelux coun-
tries, illustrating the progress made by the Pact over
Number of Aircraft the past decade in the combat capabilities of its
tactical air forces. Figure 11-12 depicts the payload
Fighter Air-to-Air Avionics and operations radius of selected Pact tactical aircraft.
2,000
Rear Hemisphere, 76. Although recent improvements have signifi-.
Visual Only cantly enhanced the capability of the Pact's tactical air
forces to conduct long-range offensive operations, the
Rear Hemisphere, basic role of these forces remains unchanged. The
Adverse Weather Pact's tactical air forces continue to have two primary
1,000 missions-air defense and ground attack support of
the Pact's ground armies. The continuing emphasis on
air defense is indicated by the high priority in equip-
500 -Aspect ment modernization accorded fighter units.
Limited Lookdown/ 77. Air-to-Air Combat. The primary mission of the
Shootdown Warsaw Pact's tactical fighter forces is to engage
0 1969 1979 NATO's aircraft, preferably over NATO territory. All
Soviet Frontal Aviation fighter units are equipped
Fighter-Bomber and Light Bomber with all-weather MIG-21 or MIG-23 aircraft. (See
Bombing/ Navigation Avionics figure II-13.) About two-thirds of the fighters in the
2,000 NSWP tactical air forces are all-weather models. The
majority of the MIG-21s are the latest variants, which,
compared with earlier MIG-21s, have a greater fuel
Limited Navigation, and payload capability, an integral gun, and improved
Visual Bombing electronic equipment. MIG-23s now are in the inven-
tories of all Soviet Groups of Forces opposite NATO
1,000 Autonomous and in the western USSR. These aircraft are equipped
Navigation, with new air-to-air missiles. They have a 360-degree
-- Visual Bombig attack capability, but at low altitudes this capability is
" 500 ; Autonomous likely to be restricted to engagements from the rear.
Bombing and They have a limited capability to engage targets flying
; YNavigation below them at target altitudes of 500 meters over land
0 1969 1979 or 300 meters over water, although in such engage-
ments only a small altitude separation is possible.
577625 1-79 CIA 78. Other Warsaw Pact all-weather fighters are
limited by their radar equipment and armaments to
attacks from the rear against most aircraft targets.
Against slow-moving targets like helicopters flying at
sessing this capability. The fewer numbers, however, about 500 meters, they would be capable of head-on
have been more than offset by an increase in the attacks. Most Warsaw Pact fighters would experience
number of fighter-bomber units. Now also, some 30 considerable difficulty against low-flying targets be-
percent of the aircraft in Pact fighter-bomber units cause of limitations both in their radar equipment and
can navigate accurately at lower altitudes in adverse in air battle management capabilities. At low altitude,
weather using only onboard avionics, although they gun-armed fighters could engage a visually acquired
v to ae talforh treie target. Fighters using semiactive radar homing, beam-still have to acquire their targets visually for precise riding, or infrared missiles would generally requirewveapons delivery, favorable conditions for completing successful missile
75. In 1969 the Pact, with its short-range, low- attacks against low-flying aircraft. Some air-to-air
payload aircraft, had only a few tactical aircraft missiles are infrared homing versions which would be
11-21
Top ecr

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.