Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped with the
hampered by those pilots-25 to 35 percent of the Flogger B, which has an all-aspect intercept and
total available-who are not qualified to conduct night limited lookdown/shootdown capability. In 1969 all
or all-weather combat missions. Moreover, pilot profi- Pact fighter-bombers relied on ground-based naviga-
ciency has not progressed sufficiently to exploit fully tion aids or dead reckoning to navigate over NATO
the capabilities of the airframes and weapon systems territory, forcing them to operate at vulnerable me-
of the third-generation aircraft currently in operation. dium altitudes. Beagle and Brewer light bombers
The Soviets acknowledge that their combat pilots are provided the Pact's only autonomous adverse weather
not trained as effectively as they should be, but for bombing/navigation capability. Today there are about
reasons that are not clear to us they do not appear to 45 percent fewer aircraft (Brewers and Fencers) pos-
be taking major corrective measures to enhance the
quality of training significantly. Such steps would
include devoting a greater share of training time to the
perforrance of combat-related tasks and introducing Figure a-10
more realism by exposing these pilots to enemy tactics dearnizatiPact Tactical Air Forces
and simulated hostile air defense environments. Opposite NATO, 1969-1979
72. Combat Capabilities.One of the most signifi-
cant developments in Warsaw Pact tactical air forces
in recent years has been their modernization through
the introduction of new aircraft. The new aircraft Percent of Total Force
have greater ranges, can carry greater payloads, are soviet
equipped with better, more advanced avionics, and 100
arc armed with better, more effective munitions.
These attributes combine to give the Pact's air forces
the capacity to deliver more effective firepower under
a greater variety of conditions. Another significant
development in recent years has been the develop- 50
ment of heavily armed helicopters.
73. The Pact began reequipping its air forces in the 25
late 1960s with fighter units receiving initial priority.
Late-model MIG-21 Fishbed and MIG-23 Flogger B
aircraft were introduced to replace earlier model 0 1969 71 73 75 77 79
Fishbeds in these units. Modernization of the fighter-
bomber forces began four to five years later with NSWP
SU-17 Fitter C/D, MIG-27 Flogger D, and some late-
model Fishbeds replacing the MIG-17 Fresco and
SU-7 Fitter A. Light-bomber units also began reequip- 75
ping in the mid-1970s by acquiring the SU-24 Fencer A
as a replacement for the YAK-28 Brewer B/C, Modern-
ization has progressed more rapidly in Soviet than in 50
the NSWP air forces. Newer aircraft now account for
about 80 percent of the Soviet force, 20 percent of the
NSWP force, and two-thirds of total Pact tactical air 25
force opposite NATO. (See figure I-10.)
74. In 1969 some 30 percent of the Pact's tactical 0 1969 71 73 75 77 79
fighters were unable to conduct aerial engagements
under adverse weather conditions; all attacks had to be
performed from the real hemisphere, and the fighters
had virtually no capability to intercept low-flying
aircraft. (See figure II-11.) Today, nearly 95 percent of 571624 1.79 CIA
Pact fighters are able to operate in adverse weather,
11-20
Toi er+