Documents / FOIA release

Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

their conventional force capabilities. Since the late 1960s they have
significantly increased manpower, tanks, artillery, armed helicopters,
and air defense. They have been equipping their tactical air forces with
aircraft having increased performance and load-carrying capacity.
During this period the flexibility and conventional war potential of
Soviet naval forces also have been improved by the acquisition of more
capable ships, submarines, and aircraft. (1, 37)
7. At the same time, the Soviets have continued to increase the size
of their theater nuclear forces and improve their flexibility. Since the
early 1970s they have introduced nuclear-capable artillery systems,
have increased their surface-to-surface tactical missile launchers in
Central Europe, have assigned nuclear missions to additional tactical
aviation units, and are deploying a new-generation intermediate-range
ballistic missile and a new bomber. The Soviet Navy has also added
systems which improve its capability to wage theater nuclear war.
(1, 39)
8. Pact theater forces have emerged from a decade of change with
their fundamental orientation on the tank intact, but with a more
balanced structure for conventional war and with both conventional
and nuclear firepower greatly increased. These changes, along with an
infusion of more modern technology, have made Soviet theater forces
competitive with leading Western armies in sophistication of organiza-
tion and equipment. (I, 43)
9. Our analysis of these developments permits the following
additional conclusions:
- The Soviets are aware of the improved technology and growing
numbers of NATO antitank weapons, but this awareness has not
led to any diminution of their tank forces or any major change in
the way they see these forces performing. Indeed, they have
made even further increases to their tank strength and have
begun producing new tank models. (II, 7)
- The Soviets are pursuing a vigorous program to increase the
effectiveness of their air munitions to exploit the enhanced
capabilities of their newer aircraft. The role of Frontal Aviation
for delivering tactical nuclear weapons clearly is expanding. (II,
89 and 158)
- The Soviet Navy in the past decade has significantly improved
its capability to participate in a Pact-NATO war and now can
undertake combat operations at greater distances from home
waters. The introduction of new classes of submarines, Backfire
bombers, and new missile systems has especially improved the
Soviet Navy's strike capability against NATO surface forces. (II,
100)
8
Top i.c

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.