Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

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- Preemption continues to be a feature of Soviet nuclear doctrine.
(1, 1.5)
- Improvements in the USSR's forward-based nuclear forces would
permit the Soviets to fight a tactical nuclear war at relatively
high levels of intensity without having to use USSR-based
systems. Nonetheless, the Soviets' continued modernization of
USSR-based peripheral strike systems
rgue that they still
expect to have to resort to the use of these weapons at some stage
of theater nuclear war. (I, 16)
4. The Soviets are clearly planning against the contingency that
chemical weapons might be used in a war between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact. They have a continuing, vigorous program to equip and
train Pact forces for operations in a toxic environment and have
produced a variety of chemical agents and delivery systems. We are
divided, however, on the question of Soviet policy for the first use of
chemical weapons. Some believe 2 that it is unlikely that the Warsaw
Pact would initiate offensive chemical warfare before the advent of
nuclear war, but that the Pact's first use under these circumstances
cannot be entirely excluded. Others believe ' there is a strong possibility
that the Soviets would initiate chemical warfare in a conventional
conflict. Chapter I contains the rationale underlying these views. (I,
18-29)
Trends in Warsaw Pact Theater Forces
5. The past decade was marked by vigorous modernization of
Soviet theater forces facing NATO. This modernization was accompa-
nied by some increase in the manpower of the forces-especially in the
late 196.Os and early 1970s-as the number of weapons in units was
increased and as support requirements grew to accommodate more,
increasingly sophisticated hardware. Modernization of the Soviet
theater forces is evidently continuing at much the same pace, along with
modest, commensurate growth in manpower. The non-Soviet Warsaw
Pact (NSWP) forces have shared in the Soviet buildup, although at a
slower pace and with uneven results, especially in the more expensive
tactical air and missile forces and in ground force armor replacement
programs. (VI, 1)
6. Motivated by the prospect of a nonnuclear phase of hostilities
and their recognition of a need for strong conventional forces even in
the event of nuclear war, the Soviets have especially sought to improve
The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency.and the Director, Bureau of Intelligence
and lesearch, Department of State.
The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director, National
Security Agency; and the Senior Intelligence Officers of each of the military services.
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