Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
TOP -SEC RE I. The Soviet Problem The contingency of war with NATO in the central region of Europe dominates all other considerations in Soviet theater forces doctrine and planning. The. size and composition of the main elements of the theater forces reflect this Soviet preoccupation with NATO in Europe. Other Warsaw Pact countries have contributed substantially to the force the Soviets deem necessary to oppose -NATO. The current difficulties with Czecho- slovakia almost certainly will lead the Soviets to consider such contributions as mixed blessings and probably to rely less on the Warsaw Pact and more on their own forces. With the Chinese, the Soviets are faced with a hostile and potentially dangerous neighbor. In spite of a common Communist heritage, both nations seem to be pursuing the mutually conflicting national objectives of past eras. The current Soviet rein- forcement along the Chinese border indicates a con- cern for the possible anti-Russian directions the agony of the Cultural Revolution might take. The already substantial requirements for aug- mentation of the general purpose forces which have developed from the Sino-Soviet conflict will now probably be increased by the desire to have stronger Soviet forces to fill the gap in Warsaw Pact defenses left by the effect of the intervention on the Czechs. These greater requirements, in combination with accelerating costs for new, more complex land arma- ments, coincide with rising demands for strategic forces outlays. Differing Soviet concepts on the use of -military power for political purposes have important impli- cations for the future structure of the theater forces. Strategic power versus usable power is currently the central, divisive issue. Divergent viewpoints on this issue have been reflected in recent statements and articles by senior military leaders. There are in- dications of an intramilitary debate over whether to pursue further improvement of strategic capa- - bilitie -oo-br-oad-a-the-saabi-is-o he-c- ventional forces. - 3O-- TOP SECRET
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.