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OSR Contribution to NIE 11-14-68, Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces, CIA/DI/OSR, October 1968.

Central Intelligence Agency · 115 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.

TOPSE5RET
their military power. Thus far, the main example
of this trend is the extension of Soviet naval and
air operations to the Mediterranean area. As the
Soviets gain experience in naval operations and
improve their naval capabilities, they can be ex-
pected to extend such activities to other areas.
The requirement for increased Soviet military
strength in Europe comes unexpectedly on top of
the substantial buildup currently under way against
China, and it may impel the USSR to re-examine its
priorities for the border program. In any case,
we expect that--at least for the next few years--
the general purpose forces will continue to grow.
Recent analysis has provided new insight into
Warsaw Pact war planning, the combat readiness of
Soviet and East European forces in peacetime, and the
plans for mobilization in the event of war with NATO
in the central region. Essentially the plans call
for the Soviets and East Europeans to maintain suf-
ficient combat-ready forces in the forward area to
defend against a surprise attack. Large-scale of-
fensive operations against NATO would require major
reinforcements from the western USSR and Poland.
A large part of these potential reinforcements--
particularly the service support elements--are
manned and equipped at low levels in peacetime.
The filling out of these forces, by mobilization
of reservists and civilian vehicles, and their
movement into the forward area could probably be
accomplished in two to three weeks.
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TO SRET

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.